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OIL FIELD PITFALLS—AVOIDING ENVIRONMENTAL 
LIABILITIES AFFECTING PETROLEUM AND NATURAL 
GAS DRILLING AND PRODUCTION
By: Walter G. Wright, Jr.
Natural Resources Law Institute
February 22, 1996
WALTER G. WRIGHT, JR . is a former assistant general counsel to the Petroleum Marketers 
Association of America in Washington, D . C., and prior to that, served on the minority staff of 
the United States House of Representatives Energy and Commerce Committee. He is a partner 
in the Little Rock, Arkansas, law firm of Mitchell, Williams, Selig, Gates & Woodyard, 
P . L. L . C., where his practice focuses on environmental and petroleum matters. For the past 
eight years, he has served as an adjunct professor of environmental law at the University of 
Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law. He also serves as counsel to the Arkansas Oil 
Marketers Association and the Arkansas Recyclers Association. Walter earned his undergraduate 
and law degrees from the University of Arkansas and a Masters of Law from George 
Washington University in Washington, D . C.
I. KEY APPLICABLE FEDERAL AND STATE ENVIRONM ENTAL PROGRAM S
A. PENDING REVISIONS TO ADPC&E REGULATION NOS. 18 AND 19:
* Note exemptions
* D e M inimis cut-offs
B. CERCLA:
1. General:
Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 to provide EPA with the authority 
to clean up hazardous waste sites and otherwise protect public health and the environment 
from releases o f hazardous substances. The enactment o f CERCLA gave EPA the authority 
to require responsible parties to undertake immediate cleanup activities without prolonged 
litigation to determine how the ultimate liability w ill be apportioned. If responsible parties 
resist or are incapable o f conducting the cleanup, EPA or the state may act with federal 
funds and seek cost recovery later. The program covers a broad range o f releases o f 
hazardous substances into the environment - from accidental one-time spills to continuing or 
intentional releases.
The CERCLA scheme is applicable to a "release" o f a "hazardous 
substance" from a "facility." These key terms have been interpreted to have an incredible 
breadth. Consequently, CERCLA actions have involved both inactive and active facilities, 
buildings and unimproved properties.
CERCLA can impact a property or company transfer, whether through 
a loan foreclosure, sim ple acquisition, or otherwise, in three main ways:
(a) persons who acquire contaminated property may be liable for
cleanup costs;
(b) persons who acquire a company that sent hazardous substances 
to a facility that has had a release (and the facility cannot properly deal with the problem); or
(c) CERCLA permits EPA to place a lien on contaminated property to 
allow the government to recoup its cleanup costs when the property is sold.
What is a hazardous substance?
(a) Key petroleum exclusion ("petroleum, crude o il or any fraction
thereof") cases:
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* W ilshire W estwood Associates v. ARCO. 881 F . 2d 801 (9th 
Cir. 1989) (gasoline containing additives covered)
* United States v. U .T . Alexander. C . A . G --86--267 (unreported) 
(crude oil tank bottoms covered)
* Cose v. Getty O il. 4 F . 3d 700 (9th Cir. 1993) (crude oil tank 
bottoms not covered) (sedimentary materials and water separated 
out containing chrysene)
* United States v . Western Processing C o., 761 F. Supp. 713 
(W .D . Wash. 1991) (gasoline and diesel tank bottoms outside 
exclusion because contaminated with metals such as nickel, 
cadmium, that flaked o ff tank walls)
* Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. California. 790 F. Supp. 
983 (C . D . Cal. 1991) (benzene listing under 1990 CAA 
Amendments doesn’t petroleum exclusion)
* KN Energy. Inc. v. Sinclair Oil Corp., Haz. Waste Lit. Rep. 
(Andrews) 29191 (D . W yo. Aug. 24, 1995) (petroleum refinery 
liable under CERCLA for releasing small amounts o f 
trichlorofluoromethane, ethylene chloride, trichloroethan, 
tricloromethane, and methylene chloride which are not normally 
found in petroleum products and therefore are not exempted by 
the petroleum exclusion)
* Caterair Int’l Corp. v. LCL Transit C o., N o. 94-C-1049, 1995 
WL 348045, Haz. Waste Lit. Rep. (Andrews) 28957 (N .D . 111. 
June 5 , 1995) (prior operator o f truck refueling and maintenance 
facility was not liable under CERCLA for release o f benzene, 
ethylbenzene, toluene, xylene ("BETX") and polynuclear 
aromatic hydrocarbons ("PNAs") since these substances are 
indigenous components o f crude oil and therefore encompassed 
with the petroleum exclusion).
(b) Other relevant cases:
* Jastran v. Phillips Petroleum C o., 844 F. Supp. 1139 (G . D .
LA. 1994) (produced water not "hazardous substance," "pit 
sludges" are)
(c) "Arranger" cases dealing with recyclables and deposit return:
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* United States v. Cello-Foil Products. Inc., 848 F. Supp 1352 
(W .D . Mich. 1994) (purchases o f solvent delivered in drums 
were not subject to CERCLA arranger liability when they 
returned empty drums containing solvent residues to vendor in 
exchange for deposit)
* United States v. Summit Equipment & Supplies. Inc., 805 F. 
Supp. 1422 (N .D . Ohio 1992) (sellers o f used equipment at 
blind auction sales were liable as arrangers even if  they did not 
know that purchaser intended to use the equipment for scrap 
metal
* Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. v . Peck Iron & Metal 
C o.. 822 F. Supp. 322 (E . D . Va. 1993) (indirect seller o f 
batteries to shredding facility liable as "arranger")
Note possible Superfund legislative recycling revisions.
* United States v. Peterson Sand & Gravel, 806 F. Supp. 1346 
(N . D . 111. 1992) (sale o f fly ash not "arrangement)
(d) Other
* Grand Truck Western Railroad Co. v. Acme Belt Recoating. 
Inc.,  859 F. Supp. 1125 (W .D. Mich. 1994) (easement holder 
not liable under CERCLA as "owner")
A lso note "used oil" cases*
2.  Potentially Responsible Parties:
Section 107(a) o f CERCLA provides that response costs may be 
recovered from four classes o f persons:
(a) the owner or operator o f the site or facility; Note-Leaseholders 
o f property: United States v . Argent. 21 ERC 1354 (D .N .M . 1984) (lessor held liable under 
CERCLA Section 107 as "owner"); United States v . South Carolina Recycling and Disposal. 
653 F. Supp. 984 (D .S .C . 1984) (lessee o f site which sublet it to another liable as "owner"); 
United States v. Northernaire Plating C o., 670 F. Supp. 742 (W .D. M ich. 1987) (lessee was 
found to be an "operator" o f a facility);
(b) any person who owned or operated the site or facility at the time 
o f the hazardous substance disposal;
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(c) any person who arranged to have his or her own waste taken to the 
site or facility for disposal or treatment; and
(d) any person who transported wastes for disposal or treatment to a 
site he or she selected.
3.  Other Possibly Responsible Parties:
In addition to the four classes o f potentially responsible parties defined 
above, the courts have interpreted the phrases "owner and operator" and "person who 
arranged for disposal" to include the following parties whose connection with the hazardous 
substances is less "direct." Examples o f such parties include the following:
(a) A secured creditor whose activities go beyond simple "indicia o f 
ownership primarily to protect his security interests,"  but extend to participation and 
oversight in the management o f facilities. See United States v. Maryland Bank and Trust 
Company. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D . Md. 1986) (bank which foreclosed on a mortgage and took 
possession o f the property liable as in "owner"); also United States v. M irabile. 15 ELR 
20994 (E . D . Pa. 1985) (bank which participated in day-to-day operations at the site prior to 
foreclosure sale may be liable as "operator"), but United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 
901 F . 2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990) (lender "participates in management" if  it takes part in the 
financial affairs o f the facility, even if  the lender is not involved in the day-to-day operation 
or management o f the facility, i.e . if  there is a "capacity to influence" the hazardous waste 
activities o f the debtor): Bergsoe Metal Corp. v. East Asiatic Company. N o. 89-35397, slip 
op. (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 1990) (creditor must as a threshold matter, exercise actual management 
authority before it can be held liable for action or inaction which results in the discharge o f 
hazardous wastes - merely having the power to get involved in management, but failing to 
exercise it, is not enough); Guidice v. BFG Electroplating and Manufacturing C o., 30 ERC 
1665 (Sept. 1, 1989) (court denied summary judgment to a bank that in 1982 foreclosed on 
an industrial property later found to be contaminated - held that by taking a Sh eriffs deed to 
the property, bank forfeited its right to assert the secured creditor exemption);
On June 5, 1991, the EPA proposed a regulation intended to clarify the 
applicability o f CERCLA to various activities associated with financing (56. Fed. Reg. 
28798). Specifically, the rule interprets the security interest exemption under CERCLA 
(found at CERCLA § 101(20)(A)) which exempts from CERCLA liability persons whose 
"indicia o f ownership" in a facility are held primarily to protect the security interest, 
provided they do not participate in the management o f the facility. Pressure from Congress 
and the financial services industry was responsible for EPA’s action. The primary reason o f 
this pressure was the financial industries’ concern about the previously cited U .S . v. Fleet 
Factors Corp. decision. Dicta in this decision suggests that a secured creditor may be liable, 
without being an operator, if  he participates in the management o f a facility "to a degree 
indicating a capacity to influence the corporations treatment o f hazardous waste." The 
court’s opinion did not discuss what level o f participation would be sufficient to support the
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inference that a security holder’s involvem ent could influence operational decisions 
concerning a facility’s treatment o f hazardous waste. To reduce the uncertainty, EPA issued 
this proposed rule to specify the range o f permissible actions that may be undertaken by the 
holder o f a security interest within the bounds o f the Section 101(20)(A) security interest 
exemption.
On April 23, 1992, EPA issued its long-awaited regulations on the 
liability o f secured lenders for environmental clean-ups under the Agency’s Superfund 
program. 1 These regulations adopted with very little change the proposal that EPA 
published almost a year ago. 2 The regulations attempt to define the actions that secured 
lenders may take with respect to contaminated commercial facilities without incurring 
Superfund liability.
The exposure o f lenders to Superfund liability arises primarily out o f 
the fact that the statute imposes responsibility for clean-ups on the current "owner or 
operator" o f a facility, and any former "owner or operator" o f the facility at the time 
hazardous substances were disposed of. The statute defines the phrase "owner or operator" 
in very broad terms, but secured lenders are specifically excluded by the following language:
[The] term ["owner or operator"] does not include a person, 
who, without participating in the management o f a facility, holds 
indicia o f ownership primarily to protect his security interest [.]3
EPA’s lender liability regulations are designed to provide holders o f 
security interests with a map for remaining within the bounds o f the security interest 
exemption. They allow a lender to engage in a broad range o f activities in the course o f 
protecting a security interest in a facility subject to Superfund.
The EPA lender liability regulations clearly state that no action by a 
covered lender prior to the creation o f the security interest can be considered evidence o f 
"management participation" for purposes o f determining Superfund liability. EPA states that 
such pre-loan activities are irrelevant for determining whether a covered lender has 
participated in the facilities management after the time that indicia o f ownership are held 
primarily to protect the security interest. Such clarification should provide a level o f comfort 
to those lenders who either require, or themselves undertake certain environmental investiga-
tory actions at facilities serving as collateral for a loan. However, in the atypical situation in
1 57 Federal Register 18344 (published April 29, 1992), to 
be codified as 40 C.F.R. § 300. 1100. The regulations also 
address the liability of governmental entities which acquire 
property involuntarily.
2 56 Federal Register 28798 (published June 24, 1991).
3 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
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which a financial institution either requires or performs remediation at a facility prior to 
financing, Superfund liability as an "operator" is still a theoretical possibility. Appropriate 
care should therefore be taken.
The EPA lender liability regulations also generally define what type o f 
financing relationships are encompassed by the security interest exemption. This is obviously 
a critical issue for the lender to consider prior to the consummation o f a transaction. Two 
key terms define the relationships encompassed by the EPA lending regulations.
First, the term "indicia o f ownership" is defined to include evidence o f 
a security interest, evidence o f an interest in a security interest, or evidence o f an interest in 
real or personal property securing a loan or other obligation, including any legal or equitable 
title to real or personal property acquired incident to foreclosure and its equivalents. EPA 
states that the exemption protects a broad range o f transactions, and it covers all transactions 
in which ownership indicia are held primarily to protect a security interest regardless o f the 
transaction’s type, form or the nomenclature given to it. Traditional security interest in real 
property, such as mortgages, liens and deed o f trust (covering both title-theory and lien- 
theory jurisdictions) cover security interests under the EPA lender liability regulations, and 
are considered to be indicia or evidence o f ownership in property held primarily to secure a 
loan or other obligation.
In addition, EPA states that so-called "lease financing" transactions, 
which are common financing transactions for equipment and other types o f personal property 
are also treated as security interests. The type o f lease financing transactions clearly 
encompassed include those in which the lessor does not initially select the leased property. 
Instead, this is done by the lessee or third party. Further, during the initial lease or any re-
lease, the lessor does not control the daily operation and maintenance o f the property. Such 
transactions typically include national bank lease financing, leveraged leases, and single 
investor leases.
Second, whether a person’s ownership indicia brings it within the 
definition o f "owner or operator” under Superfund is dependent upon its classification as 
"primarily to protect the security interest. " Therefore, the ownership interest must be 
maintained primarily for the purpose of, or primarily in connection with securing payment or 
performance o f a loan or other obligation (a security interest), and not an interest in property 
held for some other reason. In general, a transaction that give rise to a security interest is 
one that provides the holder with recourse against real or personal property o f the person 
pledging the security; the purpose o f the interest is to secure the payment o f money, the 
performance o f a duty, or some other obligation.
The EPA notes that mortgages, deeds o f trust, liens and title held 
pursuant to lease financing transactions may be encompassed. Security interest may also 
arise from transactions such as sale-and-leasebacks, conditional sales, installment sales, trust 
receipt transactions and certain factoring agreements.
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The term "holder" as used in the EPA lender liability regulations is 
considered to include the initial holder (such as the loan originator) and any subsequent 
holder, such as a successor in interest, subsequent purchaser on the secondary market, loan 
guarantor, surety, or other person who maintains indicia o f ownership primarily to protect 
the security interest. The terms "indicia o f ownership" held "primarily to protect a security 
interest" do not include evidence o f interest in the nature o f an investment in a facility, or an 
ownership interest held primarily for any reason other than as protection for security interest. 
Therefore, when a lender holds indicia o f ownership in a facility primarily for investment 
purposes as opposed to assuring repayment o f a loan, the exemption w ill not apply. Further, 
the EPA lender liability regulations do not encompass circumstances in which a lender or any 
person acts as a trustee, or in a non-lending capacity, or has any interest in a facility other 
than as provided in the rule. Therefore, trust department functions are not protected by the 
security interest exemption.
Diligent lenders typically reserve the right to undertake certain 
inspection activities at a facility serving as collateral. In the alternative, the loan documents 
may specifically provide the lender the right to require the borrower to undertake certain 
activities designed to ensure the facility’s continued compliance with the relevant federal and 
state environmental protection programs. If the lenders’ actions are deemed to constitute 
"participation in the management o f the facility" the Superfund security exemption is 
forfeited. Therefore, in order to ensure that cautious lenders do not abstain from such 
desirable activities, the EPA lender liability regulations clearly state that "participation in the 
management o f the facility" means actual participation in the management or operation o f the 
facility. It does not include the mere capacity or unexercised right or ability to influence 
facility operations. The EPA lender liability regulations also supply a list o f activities 
commonly undertaken by lenders that the agency considers to be consistent with holding 
ownership indicia primarily to protect a security interest. The nonexclusive list includes:
(1) requiring the borrower to clean up the vessel or facility during the term 
o f the security interest;
(2) requiring the borrower to comply or come into compliance with 
applicable federal, state, and local environmental statutes or regulations 
during the term o f the security interest;
(3) securing or exercising the authority to monitor and inspect the vessel or 
facility (including on-site inspections);
(4) monitoring the borrower's business or financial condition during the 
term o f the security interest; or
(5) requiring the borrower to comply with any warranties, covenants, 
conditions, representations, or promises.
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N ote that the activities identified in the EPA lender liability regulations are not the only ones 
that may be undertaken by the lender without voiding the exemption.
The lender is also permitted to undertake loan workout activities. This 
term generally includes those actions by which a holder, at any time prior to foreclosure and 
its equivalents, seeks to prevent, cure, or mitigate a default by the borrower or obligor; or to 
preserve, or prevent the diminution o f the value o f the security. A nonexclusive list o f 
activities deemed to be encompassed within this term include:
(1) restructuring or renegotiating the terms o f the security interest;
(2) requiring payment o f additional rent or interest;
(3) exercising forbearance;
(4) requiring or exercising the rights pursuant to an assignment o f counts;
(5) requiring or exercising the rights pursuant to an escrow agreement
pertaining to amounts owing to an obligor;
(6) providing specific or general financial or other guidance; or
(7) exercising any right or remedy the holder is entitled to by law or under 
any warranties, covenants, conditions, representations or promises from 
the borrower.
The EPA lender liability regulations recognize that foreclosure and 
possession o f property for purposes o f sale or liquidation is often the only remedy the lender 
may have to secure the performance o f an obligation. The security interest is not forfeited 
upon foreclosure, purchase at foreclosure sale or related activities as long as certain specific 
requirements are met.
In general, a foreclosing lender must seek to sell or otherwise divest 
itself o f foreclosed-on property in a reasonably expeditious manner using whatever 
com m ercially reasonable means available or appropriate taking all facts and circumstances 
into account. The lender cannot, consistent with the exemption, reject or refuse offers for 
the property that represent fair consideration for the asset. Specifically, the lender may 
foreclose, liquidate, sell, or wind up operations and continue the enterprise in order to 
protect the value o f the secured asset without incurring Superfund liability, unless the 
security holder fails within twelve months following foreclosure to list and advertise the 
property for sale. The lender is also prohibited from refusing a "bona fide offer. " Note, 
however, that defenses to CERCLA liability such as the secured creditor exemption are not 
transferable to a subsequent purchaser.
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Several recent federal court decisions have cited or utilized the lender 
liability regulations. One decision is W aterville Industries v. Finance Authority o f M ain.
948 F . 2d 549 (1st Cir. 1993). The litigation stemmed from efforts to clean up two waste 
water lagoons at a defunct textile m ill in W aterville, Main. First Hartford Corp. sold the 
m ill property to W aterville Textile Development Corp., a quasi-public corporation 
unconnected with the appellee in this case, and then leased it back. Loans in connection with 
the project were made to First Hartford by Society for Savings and secured by mortgages. 
FAM E, an instrumentality o f the state o f Main, guaranteed the loans. In 1980, First 
Hartford defaulted on the loans. FAME assumed First Hartford’s obligations and received 
an assignment o f the mortgages. On March 14, 1980, FAME became the title holder o f the 
property. On that same day, FAME leased the property back to First Hartford. Under the 
lease, First Hartford had the option to purchase for $1 . 00. FAME was deemed protected by 
the secured creditor exemption.
In another case involving the lender liability regulations, the Bank o f 
Montana-Butte ("Bank") has filed a motion for summary judgment against ARCO, 
contending that the Bank is not liable to ARCO for Superfund contribution at the Montana 
Pole and Treating plant. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Oaas. N o. CV-90-75-BU-PGH (D . Mont, 
pending). ARCO filed its contribution action on the basis that the Bank’s management and 
liquidation o f plant property subjected the Bank to Superfimd liability for: influencing the 
management o f hazardous substances during the Bank’s ownership, operation, and control o f 
the plant; selling contaminated plant equipment at an auction; and operating the plant in a 
manner that prompted Montana to sue the Bank for operating an unlawful storage facility.
The Bank counters that an opinion letter which it received from U .S . EPA exonerates it from 
liability. EPA’s letter applies the standards contained in U .S . EPA’s proposed lender 
liability rule. The trial court has not yet ruled on the motion.
The court in United States v. McLamb. 5 F . 3d 69 (4th Cir. 1993) 
addressed the secured creditor exemption. In 1979, the W achovia Bank & Trust ("Trust") 
took a security interest in land that included a tract known as "Potters Pits" as collateral for a 
loan it had made to one Auto Skipper. After Skipper defaulted, Trust bought the land as sole 
bidder at a foreclosure sale. Several months later, Trust sold the land to the McLambs. 
Contamination was later discovered on the property. Trust was named in a contribution suit 
by several defendants.
The plaintiffs argued that Trust was liable for CERCLA or Superfund 
contribution because it became and outright "owner" o f the site when it bought the property 
because it did not act in a commercially reasonable manner after it took title. They claimed 
that Trust failed to inform them o f a 1976 oil spill and cleanup operation before selling the 
property. The appeals court rejected the argument based on the fact that Trust bought the 
property only to protect its security interest because there were no other potential buyers.
The court noted that the record indicated no investment or profit motive for acquiring the 
property. It further noted that Trust did not engage in a bidding war at the foreclosure sale 
and almost immediately placed it on the market. It is also important to note that the court
- 10 -
declined to rely on lender liability regulations to support its findings, ruling that Trust 
qualified for the statutory exem ption. However, the court did say the result probably would 
have been the same if  it had relied on EPA’s interpretation o f the exemption.
A United States magistrate in McGuire v. Sigma Coatings. Ed. La. 
Civ. No. 91-2076 ruled that a financial institution which took over a borrower’s property 
before Superfund was enacted into law and leased it to an alleged polluter had no CERCLA 
liability. He made the ruling in recommending dism issal o f defendant FINA O ils’ 
contribution counterclaim against plaintiff W hitney National Bank and the latter’s CERCLA 
breach o f lease action stemming from the oil company’s alleged contamination o f property 
leased from the bank.
The magistrate rejected the o il company’s argument that the bank 
should be liable to it because the bank did not stop FINA at some point from polluting the 
property. It stated that the bank was not consulted by the oil company with regard to how its 
business should have been conducted. It had no capacity to exert control over their handling 
o f hazardous substances or waste. He stated that the EPA does not expect a secured lender 
to inspect the property before taking a lien thereon in order to qualify for the secured 
creditor exemption.
Unfortunately, on February 4 , 1994, U .S. Court o f Appeals for the 
District o f Columbia Circuit Court by a 2-1 vote, struck down the lender liability regulations 
in CMA v. EPA. CA DC N o. 9 2 0 1 3 1 4 . The court held that EPA lacked authority to adopt 
legislative rule that defines who is liable under CERCLA. The regulations therefore doe not 
have force as a legislative rule. The court did not comment on the substance o f the 
regulations. This invalidation o f course recreates some o f the previous uncertainty lenders 
faced. However, some o f the previously cited decisions favored lender activities without 
relying on the regulations. Courts may continue to look at to the regulations for guidance.
Congress may statutorily amend CERCLA because o f the regulations’ 
invalidation. As a practical matter, however, the federal government is unlikely to assert a 
claim under Superfund against lenders who relied on the lender liability regulations in good 
faith during the legal challenge. O f course, states or private parties could still seek to 
im pose liability upon such lenders. They may still be reviewed as guidance for when the 
lender is deemed to have stayed within the secured creditor exemption.
A further concern is whether the lender liability regulations apply 
retroactively. The EPA, however, has indicated that it w ill apply to all transactions, thus 
making it retroactive.
The EPA lender liability regulations were an important step toward 
clarifying the Superfund security exemption. Certain activities and financial products are 
clearly encompassed. However, there w ill obviously be certain non-listed activities or 
transactions which w ill require interpretation.
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It is also imperative that lenders recognize the lim ited effect o f the EPA 
lender liability regulations. They offer only EPA ’s interpretation o f select Superfund 
provisions. W hile they have (and still may) offer protection against EPA enforcement 
actions, they may not deter non-governmental entities from pursing private party Superfund 
contribution actions. Superfund’s strict joint and sever liability provisions provide non­
governmental entities an incentive to seek contributions from as many parties as possible. 
Therefore, the EPA lender liability regulations w ill not rem ove all Superfund exposure.
The EPA lender liability regulations do not, o f course, address the 
other federal environmental statutes and regulations. Som e o f the other key federal 
environmental statutes contain similar security interest exem ption language. It is uncertain 
whether these principles w ill be analogized to the other statutes. However, in the case o f the 
federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Subtitle I underground storage tank provi­
sions, EPA has stated that it w ill develop similar guidance. N ote, that in the case o f 
petroleum underground storage tanks, sophisticated financial institutions are beginning to 
structure their financing transactions to take advantage o f trust funds available in Arkansas 
and other states to somewhat mitigate the potential liabilities related to this equipment. The 
impact on relevant Arkansas environmental statutes is even more uncertain.
Lenders must also recognize that statutory environmental liability is not 
their only concern. O f equal importance, is the possibility that property that is contaminated 
or on which developm ent cannot take place (i.e ., a Corps o f Engineers 4 0 4  wetland permit 
cannot be obtained, etc. ) can be just as devastating. Therefore, EPA lender liability 
regulations do not address the potential impact on the collateral’s value.
Consequently, it is imperative that diligent lenders continue to develop 
pre-loan environmental assessm ent programs. In addition, since specifically authorized by 
the EPA lender liability regulations, lenders should utilize loan documentation provisions that 
provide the ability to monitor a facility’s condition. Environmental inspection rights or 
provisions requiring notification o f the lender in the event o f any EPA/state environmental 
reports can provide early warning o f events or conditions that may continue to impact the 
value o f the collateral. The Arkansas State Bank Department has in fact recently issued a 
guidance document entitled Managing Environmental Risk: A Practical 
Guide (Dec. 1991) which encourages such actions. Also note that 
the FDIC has also issued standards addressing environmental risk 
management that its member banks are expected to meet.
Please note that Congress is still considering 
various legislative vehicles for providing additional protection 
for financial institutions (including their trust departments).
4. Arkansas Remedial Action Trust Fund Act:
(No petroleum exclusion).
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5. Arkansas Water Pollution Control Act:
(No petroleum exclusion).
C. NATURALLY OCCURRING RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS:
D. RCRA:
Each year, U.S. industries generate substantial quanti-
ties of solid wastes as residual materials from basic manufactur-
ing processes. In addition, hundreds of thousands of service 
industry businesses [ranging from truck terminals (i.e., sol-
vents) to dry cleaners (i.e., TCE)] generate smaller quantities 
of materials. Among these wastes are hazardous materials that 
pose present or potential dangers to human health and the envi-
ronment. Uncontrolled disposal of such wastes on land has 
already caused significant groundwater contamination in some 
areas, and threatens eventual pollution at many other disposal 
sites. Improper storage or management of even small quantities 
of these materials could jeopardize the value and safety of 
thousands of active and inactive businesses and properties.
1. Subtitle C of the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act ("RCRA") regulates the generation, transportation, 
treatment, storage, and disposal of "hazardous wastes." 42 
U.S.C.S 6901 et. seq., as amended by Hazardous and Solid Waste 
Amendments of 1984, November 8, 1984.
2. RCRA primarily addresses active waste treatment, 
storage or disposal facilities, while CERCLA addresses inactive 
facilities. However, under the citizen suit provision found at 
Section 7002 (42 U.S.C. § 6972) and under the imminent hazardous 
provisions at Section 7003 (42 U.S. C. § 6973), actions for 
cleanup can be brought against past and present owners or opera-
tors of treatment, storage, or disposal facilities. See, e.g ., 
United States v. Price. 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981), aff'd. 
688 F. 2d 204 (3rd Cir. 1982) (past and present owners held liable 
under Section 7003); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical 
and Chemical Company. 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 
56 U.S.L.W. 3244, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987) (shareholders and officers 
individually held liable under Section 7003); Vermont v. Staco, 
Inc., 27 ERC 1084 (D.Vt. 1988) (shareholders and officers liable 
because of having "ultimate authority to control").
3. Operational Requirements:
(a) Identification of hazardous waste:
Note: RCRA exploration and production waste
exemption (drilling fluids, produced waters and other wastes 
"associated" with "C & P." 42 U.S.C.S 6921(b)(2)(A). Also,
may still be subject to Superfund? EPA studied this matter and
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issued a report to Congress in 1987. EPA's formal regulatory 
determination was issued in July, 1988 (53 Fed. Reg. 25446). It 
included:
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(1) Produced waters;
(2) Drilling fluids;
(3) Drill Cuttings;
(4) Rigwash;
(5) Drilling fluids and cutting from offshore 
operations;
(6) Geothermal production fluids;
(7) Hydrogen sulfide abatement waste from 
geothermal energy production;
(8) Well completion, treatment, and stimulation 
fluids;
(9) Basic sediment, water, and other tank bottoms 
from storage facilities that hold product and 
exempt wastes;
(10) Accumulated materials such as hydrocarbons, 
solids, sand, and emulsion from production 
separators, fluid treating vessels, and 
production impoundments;
(11) Pit sludges and contaminated bottoms from the 
storage or disposal of exempt wastes;
(12) Workover wastes;
(13) Gas plant dehydration wastes;
(14) Gas plant sweetening wastes for sulfur 
removal;
(15) Cooling tower blowdown;
(16) Spent filters and backwash assuming that the 
filter itself is not hazardous and the 
residue is from an exempt waste;
(17) Packing fluids;
(18) Produced sand;
(19) Pipe scale, hydrocarbon solids, hydrate, and 
other materials removed from piping and 
equipment prior to transportation;
(20) Hydrocarbon-bearing soils (contaminated 
soils);
(21) Pigging wastes from gathering lines;
(22) Certain wastes from subsurface gas storage 
and retrieval;
(23) Constituents removed from produced waters 
prior to re-injection or other disposal;
(24) Liquid hydrocarbons removed from production 
streams;
(25) Gases from production streams;
(26) Materials ejected from a well during blowdown 
operations;
(27) Waste crude oil from primary operations; and
(28) Light organics volatilized from exempt waste 
in reserve pits or impoundments
Wastes not included are:
Certain issues were clarified by EPA in 1993 (58 Fed. Reg. 15284 
(March 23, 1993)). Waste derived from treatment of exempt waste 
remain exempt.
(i) Overview:
To be considered a hazardous waste under 
RCRA, a material must first fit the definition of "solid waste" - 
that is, it must be a solid, liquid, or gas that is a discarded 
material and is abandoned, recycled, or otherwise "inherently 
waste-like.” Although this definition is quite expansive, there 
are several specific regulatory exclusions and variances that 
significantly narrow the reach of the RCRA program.
One important type of material excluded 
from the definition of solid waste is any mixture of domestic 
sewage and other wastes that passes through a sewer system to a 
treatment plant. The pre-treatment requirements under the Clean 
Water Act are intended to regulate the amount and type of materi-
als sent to a sewer. Other materials excluded from the defini-
tion of solid waste include: industrial wastewater discharges
subject to regulation under Section 402 of the Clean Water Act; 
irrigation return flows; source, and wholly domestic sewage.
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(1) Unused fracturing fluids or acids;
(2) Gas plant cooling tower cleaning wastes;
(3) Painting wastes;
(4) Oil and gas service company wastes;
(5) Vacuum truck and drum rinseate from trucks or 
drums containing nonexempt wastes;
(6) Refinery wastes;
(7) Liquid and solid wastes generated by crude 
oil tank bottom reclaimers;
(8) Used equipment lubrication oils;
(9) Waste compressor oil, filters, and blowdown;
(10) Used hydraulic fluids;
(ID Waste solvents;
(12) Waste in transportation pipeline-related 
pits;
(13) Caustic or acid cleaners;
(14) Boiler cleaning wastes;
(15) Boiler refractory bricks;
(16) Boiler scrubber fluids, sludges, and ash;
(17) Incinerator ash;
(18) Laboratory wastes;
(19) Sanitary wastes;
(20) Pesticide wastes;
(21) Radioactive tracer wastes; and
(22) Drums, insulation, and miscellaneous solid 
wastes
The aspect of the RCRA program that is 
most difficult to understand is the extent to which secondary 
materials - such as sludges, spent materials, and byproducts - 
that are recycled or used to produce other substances, become 
"wastes" and thus are subject to RCRA. Recycling material by 
burning it for energy recovery may result in solid waste classi-
fication. This classification includes those materials which are 
used to produce a fuel or are otherwise contained in fuels. In 
the latter case, the fuel itself is a solid waste. However, 
commercial chemical products which are listed in 40 C.F.R.
§ 261.33 are not solid wastes if they are themselves fuels.
Materials that are being reclaimed are 
solid wastes. According to the definitional section, a material 
is reclaimed "if it is processed to recover a usable product or 
if it is regenerated." Examples of reclaimed materials include 
recovery of lead values from spent batteries and regeneration of 
spent solvents. Certain recycled materials are specifically 
deemed not solid wastes when it can be shown that these materials 
were (1) used or reused as ingredients in an industrial process 
to make a product; (2) used or reused as effective substitutes 
for commercial products; or (3) returned to the original process 
from which they were generated, without first being reclaimed. 
Obviously, if such materials are not solid waste, they cannot be 
hazardous waste and consequently are not subject to RCRA regula-
tion.
Potential purchasers of a facility will 
want to consider what, if any, recycling methods are utilized at 
the facility. For example, is a printing facility recycling any 
of its solvents? Note that an understanding of the regulations 
is important since a potential purchaser may want to confirm that 
the facility is recycling in compliance with the regulations.
Once it is established that a material 
is a solid waste, there are two ways in which it can be desig-
nated a hazardous waste: It can exhibit one of four charac-
teristics (ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity, or extraction 
procedure ("EP") toxicity4)," or it may be specifically named on
4 On March 5, 1990, the EPA signed the Toxicity Charac-
teristic ("TC") final rule, which was designed to modify and ex-
pand the EP toxicity test. The TC differs from the EP Toxicity 
test in two ways:
(1) It expands the list of toxic constituents of concern; 
and,
(2) It establishes regulatory levels for organic toxicants 
that are generally obtained by multiplying health-based
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one of three lists published in the Code of Federal Regulations 
(hazardous wastes from nonspecific sources, hazardous wastes from 
specific sources, and discarded (in their pure form) commercial 
products or manufacturing chemical intermediates and their off- 
specification species).
A company generating a listed hazardous 
waste may petition EPA to "delist” this particular waste. A 
company seeking to delist a waste must demonstrate that the waste 
does not possess any of the qualities or components which could 
justify classifying a substance as a hazardous waste.
(ii) The "Mixture" "Derived-From" Rules:
In order to discourage companies from 
hiding their hazardous waste by mixing small quantities with 
larger quantities of innocuous, nonhazardous waste, EPA fashioned 
the so-called "mixture" rule, which provides that, with certain 
exceptions, any mixture of a solid waste and a listed hazardous 
waste is also a hazardous waste. 40 C.F.R. § 261. 3 (a)(2)(iv). 
Thus, if a single drop of a listed hazardous waste is combined 
with 20, 000 gallons of wastewater, the 20, 000 gallons of water 
containing the listed waste is itself a hazardous waste. A 
mixture of solid waste with a waste exhibiting a hazardous 
characteristic, however, is hazardous only if the mixture itself 
exhibits a hazardous characteristic.
The derived-from rule provides that any 
waste generated from the treatment, storage, or disposal of a 
listed hazardous waste is itself a hazardous waste 40 C.F.R.
S 261.3(c)(2)(i). Therefore, even if a listed hazardous waste is 
treated so that it no longer presents health concerns, the 
remaining residue is still subject to hazardous waste regulation 
unless EPA grants a site specific delisting petition.
On December 6, 1991, the D.C. Court of 
Appeals held EPA's mixture and derived-from rules invalid because 
EPA had not provided adequate notice or an opportunity for public 
comment. Shell Oil Co. v. EPA. 950 F. 2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
The Court of Appeals reviewed the history of the rulemaking 
proceeding and concluded that mixture and derived-from rules were
"chronic toxicity reference levels" by a dilution - 
attenuation factor which is generated using a ground 
water fate and transport model.
EPA estimates that 99% of new wastes coming into the hazardous 
waste management program due to the TC rule will be industrial 
wastewaters. The new provision will also expand the type and 
amount of wood treating wastes considered "hazardous wastes".
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a substantial departure from the proposals originally published 
by EPA which the public could not reasonably have anticipated. 
Since the court held the regulations invalid on procedural 
grounds, it did not attempt to reach the question whether the 
regulations exceeded EPA's statutory authority.
Apparently recognizing EPA's concerns 
that invalidation of the mixture and derived-from rules could 
open significant loopholes in the regulation of hazardous waste, 
the court suggested that EPA could readopt the mixture and 
derived-from rules on a temporary basis under the "good cause” 
exemption in the Administrative Procedure Act.
On February 18, 1992, EPA readopted the 
mixture and derived-from rules on an interim basis, but the new 
regulations contained an unprecedented one-year sunset provision. 
57 Fed. Reg. 7628 (published March 3, 1992). Under this sunset 
provision, the temporary regulation expires on April 28, 1993.
In the meantime, EPA is required to undertake rulemaking proceed-
ings to adopt new regulations that will replace the interim 
mixture and derived-from rules.
Immediately after the decision in Shell 
Oil. EPA filed a petition for rehearing and a request for clari-
fication that the court's judgment was not retroactive. EPA 
argued that retroactive application of the judgment invalidating 
the mixture and derived-from rules could have serious adverse 
effects on numerous pending enforcement proceedings. The court 
of appeals denied the Agency's petition for rehearing and denied 
the motion for clarification of the court's judgment without 
comment.
When EPA readopted the mixture and 
derived-from rules under the "good cause” exemption, it included 
in the public notice a formal statement of its view that the 
Shell Oil decision should not be applied retroactively. 57 Fed. 
Reg. 7630-31. This statement of the Agency's position of non-
retroactivity was substantially identical to the argument it had 
made to the court of appeals when it unsuccessfully sought 
clarification of the judgment.
Although EPA's readoption of the mixture 
and derived-from rules appears to have reinstated the rules as 
valid regulations on a prospective basis, it is unclear whether 
EPA's argument against retroactive application of Shell Oil 
should be viewed as persuasive in any pending enforcement pro-
ceeding. Stated more simply, it is unclear at this point whether 
any valid mixture and derived-from rules existed prior to Febru-
ary 18, 1992.
The decision in Shell Oil has signifi-
cant implications for state law because the hazardous waste
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regulations in many states incorporate by reference large por-
tions of EPA's RCRA Subtitle C rules, including the mixture and 
derived-from rules. In Arkansas, for example, Section 3(a) of 
the Hazardous Waste Management Code provides that:
The following regulations promulgated by the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency are 
hereby adopted as provisions of [the Arkansas 
Hazardous Waste Management Code] as though 
set forth herein line for line and word for 
word. . . .
Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations [Parts 260-266, 268, and 
270, with certain limited exceptions and modifications]. The EPA 
regulations incorporated by reference into the Arkansas Hazardous 
Waste Management Code include the mixture and derived-from rules.
In the wake of the Shell Oil decision, 
EPA and ADPC&E have taken the position that the state mixture and 
derived-from rules continue to be valid even though the court of 
appeals invalidated the EPA regulations upon which the state 
rules had been based. They argue that the states have indepen-
dent authority to adopt their own hazardous waste regulations and 
the adoption of state mixture and derived-from rules constitutes 
a valid exercise of the state rulemaking authority. EPA and 
ADPC&E point out that the procedural flaw in the federal regula-
tion, i.e.. inadequate notice and opportunity to comment, is not 
a problem with the state mixture and derived-from rules because 
the states gave clear notice and ample opportunity to comment 
upon the terms of the federal rules that they proposed to incor-
porate into state law. In addition, EPA and ADPC&E contend that 
a valid federal mixture and derived-from rule has always been in 
effect because they view Shell Oil as having only prospective 
effect, and EPA readopted the mixture and derived-from rules 
before the court of appeals mandate officially invalidated the 
original regulations.
The position taken by EPA and ADPC&E on 
this question is subject to serious question. It is true, of 
course, that ADPC&E has the authority to adopt its own hazardous 
waste regulations, independent of any rules adopted by EPA. In 
this instance, however, ADPC&E did nothing more than incorporate 
by reference an admittedly invalid federal regulation. The 
ADPC&E's principal motivation for incorporating the federal 
regulation by reference was to make state law essentially identi-
cal to the underlying federal law. In light of this motivation, 
it would seem that any defect in the underlying federal law 
should be imputed to the state law as well. Moreover, since 
ADPC&E was anxious to adopt state rules essentially identical to 
the underlying federal regulations, the notice and opportunity to 
comment at the state level on the merits of the mixture and 
derived-from rules was largely meaningless.
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EPA and ADPC&E argue that any defect in 
the state mixture and derived-from rules that might have existed 
prior to February 18, 1992, was cured when EPA readopted the 
federal mixture and derived-from rules under the "good cause” 
exemption. According to this argument, state law now incorpo-
rates by reference the newly adopted, and presumably valid, 
federal mixture and derived-from rules. The general rules 
governing incorporation by reference, however, suggest that this 
argument is incorrect.
Where one statute or regulation adopts 
the terms of another statute or regulation by specific reference, 
it is generally held that the adopting statute or rule is not 
affected by subsequent amendment or repeal of that statute or 
rule that was adopted by reference, e.g ., Bolar v. Cavaness, 271 
Ark. 69, 607 S.W.2d 367 (1980); Annot., 168 A.L. R. 627 (1947). 
Under this rule, it would seem that ADPC&E's adoption of a state 
mixture and derived-from rule by specific reference to the origi-
nal EPA rules could not be cured by EPA's subsequent readoption 
of the federal mixture and derived-from rules.
It should be noted that one state court 
has already addressed the effect of the Shell Oil decision on 
state law and concluded that the state rules were also invalid. 
Eauidae Partners v. Oklahoma State Department of Health, Case No. 
C-91-532 (Dist. Ct. Washington County, Oklahoma, decided January 
16, 1992) (invalidating the Oklahoma derived-from rule, which had 
incorporated by reference the EPA derived-from rule).
EPA eventually proposed two options to 
replace the mixture and derived-from rules. The proposal was 
published May 20, 1992 in the Federal Register. 57 Fed. Reg. 
21450-21522. It was eventually withdrawn. However, it is 
probably helpful to analyze this previous proposal as the agency 
will likely consider similar concepts again.
The focal point of the proposal was the 
two modifications to the definition of hazardous waste. The 
first proposal, the concentration-based exemption criteria 
(”CBEC”), would provide an exit from Subtitle C regulation based 
on the concentration of hazardous constituents in a listed 
hazardous waste, waste mixtures, treatment residues and media 
(including soil and ground water) contaminated with listed 
wastes. CBEC would eliminate some low-risk wastes from hazardous 
waste regulation, but it would do so largely within the parame-
ters of the existing hazardous waste regulatory system.
EPA's second option would have more 
broadly altered the existing structure of hazardous waste regula-
tion. The second exemption, based on the toxicity characteristic 
(the Expanded Characteristics Option or "ECHO”) would eliminate: 
(1) the mixture rule; (2) the derived-from rule; and (3) hazard-
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(iv) Used Oil (the special exception):
The 1984 amendments to RCRA required EPA 
to propose whether to identify or list used automobile and truck 
crankcase oil by November 8, 1985, and to make a final determina-
tion as to whether to identify or list any or all used oils by 
November 8, 1986. On November 29, 1985 (50 Fed. Reg. 49258), EPA 
proposed to list all used oils as hazardous waste, including 
petroleum-derived and synthetic oils, based on the presence of 
toxic constituents at levels of concern during and after use.
Also on November 29, 1985, EPA proposed management standards for 
recycled used oil (50 Fed. Reg. 49212) and issued final regula-
tions incorporated at 40 C.F.R. Part 266, Subpart E, prohibiting 
the burning of off-specification used oil fuels in non-industrial 
boilers and furnaces (50 Fed. Reg. 49164). Marketers of used oil 
fuel and industrial burners of off-specification fuel are re-
quired to notify EPA of their activities and to comply with 
certain administrative requirements. Used oils that meet the 
used oil fuel specification are exempt from most of the 40 C.F.R . 
Part 266, Subpart E regulations.
On November 19, 1986, EPA reversed 
itself and issued a decision not to list as a hazardous waste 
used oil that is recycled (51 Fed. Reg. 41900). At that time, it 
was EPA's belief that the stigmatic effects associated with a 
hazardous waste listing might discourage the recycling of used 
oil, thereby resulting in increased disposal of used oil in 
uncontrolled manners. EPA stated that several residues, 
wastewaters, and sludges associated with the recycling of used 
oil may be evaluated to determine if a hazardous waste listing 
for these residuals was necessary, even if used oil was not 
listed as a hazardous waste. EPA also outlined a plan that 
included making a determination of whether or not to list, as a 
hazardous waste, used oil that is disposed and promulgation of 
special management standards for recycled oil.
EPA's decision not to list used oil as a 
hazardous waste based on the potential stigmatic effects was 
challenged by the Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, the Associa-
tion of Petroleum Re-refiners, and the Natural Resources Defense 
Council.
On October 7, 1988, the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia found that EPA acted contrary to law 
in its determination not to list used oil under RCRA § 3001 based 
on the stigmatic effects. (See Hazardous Waste Treatment Council 
v. EPA. 861 F. 2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (HWTC II). The court ruled 
that EPA must determine whether to list any used oils based on 
the technical criteria for waste listings specified in the 
statute and in EPA's implementing regulations.
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On May 20, 1992 (57 Fed. Reg. 21524), 
the EPA decided that the current regulatory structure controlling 
the management of used oil destined for disposal provides ade-
quate controls so that used oil will not pose a substantial 
threat to human health or the environment. However, it decided 
not to list used oil as a hazardous waste. Used oils exhibiting 
one or more of the characteristics of hazardous waste and which 
are destined for disposal continue to be regulated as hazardous 
wastes in accordance with all applicable subtitle C regulations, 
except when stored in RCRA subtitle I underground storage tanks. 
Mixtures of used oils and listed hazardous wastes are listed 
hazardous wastes, and used oil mixed with a characteristic 
hazardous waste must be managed as a hazardous waste if it still 
exhibits a characteristic. Such mixtures must be managed in 
accordance with all applicable Subtitle C hazardous waste regula-
tions.
EPA also created an exemption for used 
oil filters at 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b)(13) which identifies solid 
wastes that are not hazardous wastes. This exemption is limited 
to non-terne-plated used oil filters which have been drained to 
remove used oil. As a practical matter, if an oil filter is 
picked up by hand or lifted by machinery and used oil immediately 
drips or runs from the filter, the filter should not be consid-
ered to be drained. EPA is requiring that filters qualifying for 
the exemption first have the used oil removed using one of the 
following gravity hot-draining methods:
(1) puncturing the filter anti-drain back valve or the 
filter dome end and hot-draining;
(2) hot-draining and crushing;
(3) dismantling and hot-draining; or
(4) any other equivalent hot-draining method which will 
remove used oil. Then, once the used oil is removed, 
it can be recycled (as can the scrap metal).
(b) Duties and Obligations of 
Hazardous Waste Generators:
Each of the generator's requirements are 
discussed below. A generator's duties and obligations under most 
state laws (including Arkansas) are similar to the federal 
regulations discussed here, although generators should consult 
the applicable state regulations. Since Arkansas obtained 
delegation of the federal RCRA Subtitle C program, it has adopted 
through incorporation by reference in the Arkansas Hazardous 
Waste Management Code ("AHWMC") most of the federal provisions. 
However, some of the AHWMC provisions do vary from the federal 
regulations.
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EPA defines a "generator” at 40 C.F.R. § 260.10 as:
any person, by site, whose act or process produces 
hazardous waste identified or listed in Part 261 of 
this chapter or whose act first causes a hazardous 
waste to become subject to regulation.
Section 1004(15) of RCRA defines "person" as:
an individual, trust, firm, joint stock company, corpo-
ration, (including a government corporation), partner-
ship, association, State, municipality, commission, 
political subdivision of a State, or any interstate 
body.
A person who is not normally a generator can incur generator 
liability by engaging in certain activities. For example, a 
waste generator who cleans up a spill, or an independent contrac-
tor who cleans out a tank and thereby produces hazardous waste 
residue, will be considered a generator and be subject to RCRA 
regulations. Although EPA has stated that it will respect 
agreements between private parties that assign generator duties, 
it reserves the right to hold both the original generator, and 
any other person whose act first gives rise to RCRA regulation, 
jointly and severally liable for compliance with the generator's 
obligations at each facility.
*Hazardous waste identification
Hazardous waste generators must determine whether a material 
is a hazardous waste by applying the methods for hazardous 
waste identification described above. If the waste is not 
listed, the generator must determine if it exhibits hazard-
ous waste characteristics by either testing the waste or 
"applying knowledge of the hazardous characteristic of the 
waste in light of the materials or the processes used. " 
Likewise, the generator should determining whether the 
hazardous waste is specifically excluded from RCRA regula-
tion.
*Obtaining EPA identification number
Every generator who determines that he is producing hazard-
ous waste must obtain an EPA Identification Number, pursuant 
to 40 C.F.R. Section 262. 12. EPA Identification Numbers are 
obtained by applying to the EPA Administrator, using EPA 
Form 8700-12. It is illegal for a generator to treat, 
store, dispose of, transport, or offer for transportation 
hazardous waste without having obtained the Identification 
Number. Likewise, it is illegal for a generator to offer 
his hazardous waste to transporters or TSD facilities that 
have not received such a number.
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*The manifest system
In March, 1984, in conjunction with the U.S. Department of 
Transportation, EPA published a Uniform Hazardous Waste 
Manifest to ensure that hazardous waste destined for off-
site treatment, storage, or disposal ("TSD"), actually 
reaches its destination and to keep track of its travels 
along the way. Generators of hazardous waste are respon-
sible for ensuring that a manifest has been properly pre-
pared before the hazardous waste is removed from the site.
The manifest itself requires that the generator supply the 
following information: (1) the manifest document number; (2) 
the generator's name, address, telephone number, and EPA 
Identification Number; (3) every transporter's name, tele-
phone number, and EPA Identification Number; (4) the desig-
nated and alternate TSD facilities' name, address, telephone 
number, and EPA Identification Number; (5) the U.S. Depart-
ment of Transportation description of the waste, including 
the proper shipping name, hazard class, and Identification 
Number; (6) the number and type of containers used to trans-
port the waste; (7) the total quantity of each hazardous 
waste by weight or volume; (8) the waste handling coder and 
(9) the generator's certification that the hazardous waste 
has been properly described, classified, packed, marked, 
labeled, and is in proper condition for transportation.
The manifest must be used whenever a generator transports, 
or offers to transport hazardous waste for off-site treat-
ment, storage, or disposal. The generator is required to 
designate on the manifest the one TSD facility that is 
permitted to receive the waste. An alternate facility may 
be included in case an emergency prevents the designated 
facility from receiving the waste. If neither of these 
facilities can accept the waste, the generator must either 
designate another facility or have the transporter return 
the waste.
In the event the generator does not receive a signed copy 
of the manifest from the TSD facility within 35 days after 
the waste is accepted by the original transporter, the 
generator must contact the transporter and the TSD facility 
to determine whether the waste and manifest were ever re-
ceived. If the signed manifest is not received within 45 
days, the generator must submit an Exception Report to the 
EPA Regional Administrator that must include a copy of the 
manifest and a cover letter explaining the generator's ef-
forts to locate the hazardous waste and the results of those 
efforts.
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*Pre-transport requirements
In addition to preparing manifests for the shipment of haz-
ardous waste off-site, generators are also responsible for 
packaging, labeling, marking, and placarding the waste prior 
to its transportation. EPA has adopted U.S. Department of 
Transportation regulations regarding these procedures, which 
are found at 49 C.F.R. Parts 172, 173, 178, and 179.
*Accumulation time
EPA's regulations allow a generator to accumulate hazardous 
waste on-site for up to 90 days without having to obtain a 
TSD facility permit or without having interim status, wheth-
er the generator plans to treat or dispose of the waste on-
site or plans to ship it off-site to a TSD facility, as long 
as certain regulatory requirements are met. In order to 
store hazardous waste for this 90-day period a generator 
must:
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This 90-day period may be extended by EPA for up to 30 days 
upon a showing of unforeseen, temporary, and uncontrollable 
circumstances. In addition, "small quantity generators" 
(described below) have up to 180 days to accumulate their 
waste.
*Recordkeeping and reporting requirements
EPA's regulations require that hazardous waste generators 
keep three difference types of records. First, the genera-
tor must keep a copy of all manifests signed by the desig-
nated TSD facility that received the waste for a period of 
three years from the date the waste was accepted by the 
initial transporter. Second, copies of any Exception Re-
ports or biennial reports (discussed below) must also be re-
tained for three years. Finally, the records of all test 
results, waste analyses, or other date upon which a hazard-
(1) Place the waste in containers and comply with 40 C.F.R. 
Part 265, Subpart I, or place the waste in tanks and 
comply with 40 C.F.R. Part 265, Subpart 5;
(2) Clearly mark on the outside of the container the date 
upon which the period of accumulation begins;
(3) Clearly label the container or tank "Hazardous Waste"; 
and
(4) Comply with personnel training, facility prevention and 
preparedness, contingency plan, and emergency response 
procedures set forth at 40 C.F.R. Part 265, which apply 
to interim-status TSD facilities.
ous waste determination was made must be kept for a least 
three years from the date the waste was last sent to a TSD 
facility. If EPA is the regulatory authority within a 
state, hazardous waste generators must submit biennial 
reports to EPA.
*Special requirements for small quantity generators
The EPA has established less rigorous regulations for condi-
tionally exempt small quantity waste generators —  those 
generators who produce no more than 100 kilograms of hazard-
ous waste in a calendar month. Generators of acute hazard-
ous waste may generate no more than 1 kilogram of acute 
hazardous waste in a calendar month to qualify for small 
quantity generator status. Conditionally exempt small 
quantity generators' hazardous wastes are not subject to 
regulation under 40 C.F.R. Parts 124, 252 through 255, 268 
and 270. Generators who produce more than 100 but less than 
1,000 kilograms per month are also exempt from certain Sub- 
Title C requirements (i.e., they have the ability to accum-
ulate wastes up to 180 days).
The records and documents required to be maintained by these 
provisions can provide useful information to a potential 
purchaser. Therefore, these documents and records should be 
obtained and reviewed.
(c) Treatment - Storage - Disposal issues;
Any facility that treats, stores, or disposes 
of hazardous waste, and that is not eligible for an exemption, 
must obtain a permit from EPA or an authorized state agency. 
Permits incorporate those minimum national substantive standards 
that are set out in 40 C.F.R. Part 264. The comprehensive 
regulatory scheme of Part 264 includes general standards applica-
ble to virtually all TSDs: identification numbers, personnel 
training, facility security, and routine inspection; rules for 
preparedness and prevention (such as communication systems and 
fire-control equipment); requirements for contingency plans and 
emergency procedures; manifest, recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements; standards governing the closure, post-closure care, 
and monitoring of disposal facilities; and requirements for 
financial assurance regarding facility closure and post-closure 
care, and liability coverage for third-party property damage and 
bodily injury.
In addition to these general requirements, 
there are specific permitting standards that govern the design, 
performance, and operation of specific categories of waste 
management units: containers, tanks, incinerators, waste piles, 
surface impoundments, land treatment units, landfills and other 
containers.
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As a result of the statutory changes in 1984, 
all applicants for landfill or surface impoundment permits must 
now submit a health assessment addressing the potential for 
public exposure to releases from those units. Air emissions at 
TSDs will be regulated, and EPA is authorized to add other appro-
priate conditions to TSD permits to protect human health and the 
environment, even if the conditions are not specifically imposed 
by Sub-Title C regulations.
EPA is issuing pursuant to a staggered time 
frame, regulations prohibiting the land disposal of all hazardous 
wastes that have not first been treated to minimize their toxici-
ty, unless an interested party demonstrates to EPA that "to a 
reasonable degree of certainty,. . .  there will be no migration 
of hazardous constituents from the disposal unit or injection 
zone for as long as the waste remains hazardous." EPA rulemaking 
in this area has established that treatment standards (which may 
be expressed as specified treatment technologies or as concentra-
tions of restricted materials in a waste or waste extract) will 
be set on the basis of the "best demonstrated available treatment 
technology;" which, among other criteria, has been "demonstrated" 
through the operation of a full scale facility and provides 
"substantial treatment" of the waste.
Most facilities that produce, market, and 
burn hazardous waste-derived fuel are required to notify EPA of 
their activities. EPA is directed to promulgate standards to be 
used in drafting permits for these facilities. Initial 
rulemaking in this area has banned outright the burning of 
hazardous waste fuel and contaminated used oil in nonindustrial 
boilers (for example, those located in apartment and office 
buildings, schools, and hospitals) unless the boilers comply with 
interim status incinerator standards and the notification and 
storage requirements applicable to industrial burners of waste 
fuels. Furthermore, it is now illegal to transport hazardous 
waste fuels without an accompanying manifest.
Eventually, every operating hazardous waste 
management facility, regardless of its age or operating history, 
must have a final RCRA permit issued in compliance with the Part 
264 permitting standards. Congress recognized, however, that the 
administrative task of issuing permits to every hazardous waste 
management facility would consume many years. Accordingly, RCRA 
grants "interim status" to those facilities that (1) were in 
existence on November 19, 1980 (or on the effective date of a 
change under the Act that rendered them subject to the require-
ment of obtaining a permit); (2) complied with certain notifica-
tion requirements; and (3) initially applied for a final RCRA 
permit in a timely fashion. Until a permit is finally granted or 
denied at the administrative level, an interim status facility is 
allowed to continue to operate as long as it meets certain self-
executing requirements, set out in 40 C.F.R. Part 265. A land
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disposal facility lost its interim status on November 8, 1985, 
unless it submitted its complete application for a full permit 
and certified that it was in compliance with the interim status 
groundwater monitoring and financial assurance requirements.
Section 3004(u) provides that all RCRA 
permits - including those issued for storage units and for 
postclosure care - must require "corrective action for all 
releases of hazardous waste or constituents from any solid waste 
management unit at [the]... facility... regardless of the time at 
which the waste was placed in such unit." These permits must 
also contain enforceable assurances that the permittee will 
complete the cleanup. EPA has interpreted this corrective action 
authority broadly.
An increasingly important part of the RCRA 
program is the use of groundwater protection standards to measure 
the adequacy of remedial actions. Once it has been demonstrated 
that there is contamination due to releases from a RCRA facility, 
the EPA Regional Administrator or a state director is obligated 
to craft a permit that will contain specific pollutant concentra-
tion limits that may not be exceeded at the boundary of the waste 
management area. Those concentration limits may be derived from 
any one, or a combination, of three sources: They may represent
"background levels"; they may be the Safe Drinking Water Act 
primary drinking water standards; or they may be alternate 
concentration limits ("ACLs"), determined not to pose a substan-
tial present of potential hazard to human health or the environ-
ment, taking into consideration a number of factors. Because the 
use of background levels often dictates selection of a remedy 
that is extremely costly, if not infeasible, and because there 
are relatively few substances regulated under the Safe Drinking 
Water Act, in most significant RCRA groundwater cleanup cases, 
there are powerful incentives for a permittee to make an ACL 
demonstration.
4. An individual or company acquiring an interest in 
a facility containing a hazardous waste management unit, such as 
a lagoon, surface impoundment or tank, should consider the 
following:
(a) the facility must be permitted under RCRA and 
be operated in full compliance with such permit; and
(b) corrective action to clean up the full extent 
of any groundwater contamination at the facility must be insti-
tuted, whether or not it resulted from hazardous waste management 
activities.
5. Because the generator of hazardous waste initiates 
the waste management cycle, the generator is a central figure in 
the "cradle to grave" regulatory scheme. Hundreds of thousands
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of businesses such as dry cleaners, printing shops and vehicle 
maintenance centers produce varying amounts of hazardous wastes 
and are therefore classified as "generators” in the RCRA scheme. 
Generators are obligated to comply with a number of requirements 
which include proper hazardous waste manifesting, storage and 
identification. The failure to comply with these requirements 
can subject the generator to civil and criminal penalties. Of 
equal importance, the failure by a company to comply with these 
basic RCRA requirements may be a sign of past improper waste 
management practices and necessitate greater scrutiny on the part 
of anyone considering the acquisition of such operation.
6. Why is a basic understanding of RCRA important? 
Anyone advising a business or participating in the sale or 
purchase of a business or property should have a basic familiar-
ity with RCRA. The reason for this is several fold. First, and 
most obvious, non-compliance can lead to severe penalties.
Second, non-compliance with RCRA, even the simple requirements, 
is an indication that this facility may be a risky investment. 
Third, a failure to use proper RCRA disposal or treatment facili-
ties can mean that this facility may face CERCLA exposure in the 
future as renegade disposal sites are discovered.
E. CLEAN WATER ACT;
Status of Arkansas stormwater program.
F. UNDER AND ABOVE GROUND STORAGE TANK PROGRAMS:
1. See appended chapter.
2. The Arkansas Tank Program:
UST concerns came to the attention of the Arkansas 
state legislature in 1987. Former state representative John 
Lipton chaired a Joint Interim Committee to review the impact of 
the upcoming federal regulations on UST owners and operators.
The Joint Interim Committee heard testimony concerning the high 
cost of insurance, potential for loss of retail motor fuel 
outlets in rural areas and the need for the state of Arkansas to 
establish its own technical standards along with a state trust 
fund. The Committee ultimately recommended that such legislation 
be drafted and introduced in the 77th General Assembly.
In 1989, the Arkansas legislature passed Acts 172 
(Ark. Code Ann. §  8-7-801 to 813) and 173 (Ark. Code Ann. §§ 8- 
7-901 to 909) without a dissenting vote. Section 8-7-802 pro-
vides the Arkansas Department of Pollution Control and Ecology 
("ADPC&E") with the statutory authority to promulgate a regulato-
ry program. Section 8-7-803 provides that this regulatory 
program shall be as identical as possible to the federal régula-
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tions. The ADPC&E, in April, 1995, obtained complete delegation 
of the federal program. Consequently, a UST owner or operator 
will typically deal with the ADPC&E rather than the EPA. Section 
8-7-802 also provides the ADPC&E with the authority to perform 
corrective actions at UST sites and recover such costs from the 
owner or operator. An annual registration fee is imposed on both 
USTs and certain above ground storage tanks (that hold between 
1,320 and 30,000 gallons).
The purpose of former Act 173 is twofold. First, 
the trust fund provision (§ 8-7-905) allows eligible petroleum 
UST owners or operators to satisfy a portion of the financial 
responsibility requirements. Second, it creates a permanent fund 
(with a 15 million dollar cap) to reimburse eligible petroleum 
UST owners and operators or injured third parties for a specified 
portion of corrective action or property damage or bodily injury. 
Note that unlike many state trust funds, certain above ground 
storage tanks (that hold between 1,320 and 30,000 gallons) may 
utilize the fund.
The Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund is capital-
ized by a yearly registration fee and a $.002 per gallon petro-
leum environmental assurance fee. The Arkansas legislature in 
the 1995 regular session, passed legislation (Senate Bill 688) 
that allows bonds to be issued (pledging the.002) to provide 
further financial strength for the trust fund.
The trust fund covers and provides reimbursement 
for corrective action costs above $25,000 and up to $1,000,000 
per occurrence. The scope of coverage for third-party property 
damage and bodily injury claims also begins at $25, 000 and 
terminates at $1,000,000. The trust fund statute was amended in 
1991 by Act 65 to provide reimbursement without a deductible for 
owners and operators for short-term testing or monitoring re-
quired by the federal or state regulations the tank is found 
not to be the source of the release. The intent was to provide 
all UST owners and operators in the vicinity of the petroleum 
release, an incentive to cooperate in finding the true source of 
the release.
UST or AST owners or operators submit claims for 
reimbursement to the ADPC&E Regulated Storage Tank Division 
("RSTD"). The trust fund Advisory Committee reviews the recom-
mendation of the ADPC&E staff regarding eligibility of all or 
part of a claim and renders a decision. The trust fund will 
reimburse costs only if proof is provided that:
corrective action has adequately addressed the release;
all annual Arkansas UST or AST registration fees have 
been paid;
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—  the owner or operator cooperated with the ADPC&E staff;
the owner or operator was in substantial compliance, 
with all state and federal laws and regulations relat-
ing to ASTs or USTs; and,
timely notice of the release was given.
The § 8-7-907 prerequisites for granting reimbursement provide a 
significant incentive for owners and operators to comply with the 
regulations, thereby eliminating or at least minimizing leakage 
or spillage in the future.
UST owners or operators should understand that it 
is critical they maintain compliance with the relevant federal 
and state statutes and regulations to ensure trust fund eligibil-
ity. What constitutes "substantial compliance" is not defined in 
either the statute or the regulations. The ADPC&E staff conse-
quently has some discretion in deciding what constitutes substan-
tial compliance in their recommendation to the Advisory Commit-
tee. The ADPC&E position as to what constitutes substantial 
compliance seems to be evolving. Only informal ADPC&E memoranda 
limited in scope address the issue. Note that even if the staff 
disagrees whether a given UST or AST is in substantial compli-
ance, the Advisory Committee can exercise its own judgment.
Both Subchapter 8 (§S 8-7-801 to 813) and Sub-
chapter 9 (§§ 8-7-901 to 909) require the ADPC&E to promulgate 
regulatory packages to implement the key provisions of each 
program. The ADPC&E promulgated Regulation No. 12 to not only 
incorporate virtually the entire federal program, but to set 
forth the details of the state program, especially the reimburse-
ment process.
Regulation No. 12 addresses a range of UST-related 
topics including ADPC&E facility access for inspection, registra-
tion/licensing fees, fund eligibility, reimbursement claims 
procedure and reimbursement application review. A major portion 
of the regulation is devoted to the licensing of storage tank 
installers and tank testers. The regulation makes clear that for 
any claim against the trust fund, the associated release must 
have been discovered and reported after February 22, 1989. The 
ADPC&E is currently circulating extensive proposed revisions to 
Regulation No. 12.
UST and AST releases can potentially cause proper-
ty damage and/or bodily injuries. Consequently, a UST or AST 
release can potentially trigger lawsuits for recovery of damages. 
The trust fund can reimburse, subject to a $25,000 deductible, 
third-party property damage and/or bodily injuries caused by AST 
or UST releases.
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The trust fund statute and ADPC&E Regulation No.
12 provide that judgments for damages that fit within the scope 
of the terms "property damage" and/or "bodily injury" are reim-
bursable. In addition, both the trust fund statute and the 
ADPC&E Regulation No. 12 have set up a procedure by which ADPC&E 
storage tank staff can recommend to the Advisory Committee (which 
also oversees this reimbursement process) a settlement of third- 
party claims if the anticipated cost of a trial (if a judgment 
was obtained) would exceed a settlement amount. Because the vast 
majority of UST and AST releases causing property damage and/or 
bodily injury are not insured, the role of the trust fund in 
facilitating settlement or reimbursing a judgment of valid claims 
is critical.
The Trust Fund reimburses not only third parties, 
but also the eligible owner/operator for at least part of her 
required "corrective action." The regulation contains fairly 
detailed instruction as to the form of the application, required 
receipts, and definitions of "allowable" and "reasonable" costs. 
As with third-party reimbursement, the corrective action reim-
bursement approval process flows from the ADPC&E staff to the 
Advisory Committee to, ultimately, the Arkansas Pollution Control 
and Ecology Commission.
In addition to Regulation No. 12, the ADPC&E RSTD 
has recently published informal, yet strongly suggested, 
guidelines to further assist owners/operators in the corrective 
action reimbursement process. Because Regulation No. 12 allows 
reimbursement only for "reasonable" costs incurred to correct a 
release, the guidelines are intended to provide insight into the 
costs the ADPC&E will deem reasonable and, therefore, reimburs-
able.
The guidelines offer quite specific information 
concerning the selection of equipment (lease versus buy), the 
calculation of a consultant's profit, and even limits to the 
percentage ownership of consultants/vendors by owners/operators 
so as to avoid conflicts of interest that could jeopardize 
reimbursement. A matrix of reasonable and customary charge for a 
typical clean-up is provided, comparing Arkansas rates to Louisi-
ana and Tennessee. Finally, a series of one-page EPA publica-
tions titled "Controlling UST Cleanup Costs" is attached to the 
guidelines.
In summary, the Arkansas Storage Tank Program is 
in reality an accumulation of law from five sources: federal
statutes (RCRA, CERCLA, etc. ), federal regulations, states 
statutes (petroleum storage tank trust fund statutes), state 
regulations (No. 12), and ADPC&E guidelines. It cannot be 
emphasized enough that the UST/AST owner/operator must comply 
with all applicable law at each appropriate step in the process.
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Otherwise, the availability of the trust fund to offset the 
associated costs of a release may be jeopardized if not forfeit-
ed.
An article providing an in-depth analysis of 
storage tank trust funds is found at, Wright, In Storage Funds We 
Trust; An Analysis of Their Role in Protecting the Environment 
and Small Businesses. 13 U.A.L.R. L.J. 417 (1991).
3. Third-Party Property Damage and Bodily Injury
Claim Issues;
As previously described, some of the state petro-
leum storage tank trust funds provide coverage for third-party 
property damage and/or bodily injury claims. Most of the state 
trust fund statutes and regulations do not clearly specify how 
the third-party claim reimbursement process works. For example, 
a number of state trust funds simply provide coverage if a 
judgment is obtained against the owner or operator. The judgment 
must be for damages encompassed by the terms "property damage" 
and "bodily injury." Whether or not, for example, certain 
alleged damages such as "mental distress” constitute "bodily 
injury" for trust fund purposes is an open question.
A number of trust funds allow the storage tank 
owner or operator to settle the third-party claim and obtain 
reimbursement if the state environmental agency or reviewing 
committee determines that it is in the best interest of the trust 
fund (i.e., proceeding to trial will result in a larger amount).
A related issue usually arises shortly after the 
discovery of petroleum contamination at a facility. Some state 
environmental agencies will require the storage tank owner or 
operator to enter into a consent administrative order ("CAO") to 
ensure timely investigatory and corrective action efforts. The 
CAO will often include Findings of Fact stating that the UST is 
the source of a petroleum release. Counsel should carefully 
scrutinize and revise the CAO to ensure that they do not jeopar-
dize the inevitable third-party property damage or bodily injury 
claim defense against suits brought by adjacent or nearby land- 
owners. The state environmental agency should, of course, be 
somewhat sympathetic since there is not a strict need for an 
admission of certain facts, and they may, in fact, ultimately 
have to fund the payment of such third-party claims with trust 
fund monies.
Another related issue involves the negotiation of 
access agreements. Often the UST or AST owner or operator must 
obtain access to adjoining or nearby properties for placement of 
investigative or remediation equipment to address the release. 
Both the adjoining or nearby landowner and UST/AST owner or 
operator must carefully consider a variety of issues in negotiat-
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ing the access agreement. These include admission of liability, 
insurance, repairs once the work is completed (for example, is a 
"patched" parking lot adequate? ), interference with continued use 
of the property, etc. In Arkansas for example, the ADPC&E may 
(through Ark. Code Ann. § 8-7-807(c)) use certain authorities to 
obtain access to a property if it is denied in certain circum-
stances. The legality of these statutes is untested in the 
courts.
Plaintiffs' attorneys often face interesting 
issues. On the one hand, they have an incentive to allege in 
their pleadings that the storage tank owner did not strictly 
comply with the relevant federal or state regulations in an 
attempt to advocate punitive damages. Yet, pushing this issue 
may not be helpful to the plaintiff if a storage tank owner that 
is attempting to convince the state environmental agency person-
nel that he or she should be eligible for trust fund reimburse-
ment (i.e., is the UST/AST in "substantial compliance?"). Non- 
compliance storage tank owners without access to the trust fund 
may be unable to satisfy a judgment, leaving the winning plain-
tiff without recovery.
State environmental agencies are also beginning to 
grapple with the reimbursement of third-party property damage and 
bodily injury claims. As mentioned, the reimbursement procedures 
are often unclear. In addition, the scope of the terms "proper-
ty" damage and "bodily" injury is subject to various interpre-
tations. Parties settling third-party property damage and bodily 
injury claims must consider the state environmental agencies 
views of these definitions. For example, a defendant storage 
tank owner would want to ensure that the settlement clearly 
reflects and documents the fact that damages suffered by plain-
tiff fall within the scope of the terms "property damage" and 
"bodily injury" as defined by the agency. State environmental 
agency personnel are often uncomfortable with their developing 
role as claims adjusters. Failing to coordinate with state 
environmental agency personnel could result in the denial for 
reimbursement of some or all third-party claims.
The scope of the terms "property damage" and 
"bodily injury" will be important. The federal regulations 
provide that these terms are defined by state law. State common 
law, however, does not typically consider whether items such as 
access fees (i.e., monies paid to a landowner to allow a tempo-
rary placement of wells) constitute "property damage." Further, 
are costs expended to preserve the value of the property (i.e., 
remote sensing devices for temporarily abandoned houses) within 
the scope of the term property damage? Certainly, these costs 
may constitute corrective action expenses. However, there will 
be a number of instances in which the storage tank owner is, or 
will be, expending one million dollars on the corrective action 
side of the trust fund program. Therefore, the storage tank
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owner may have an incentive to classify a number of costs as 
third-party property damage or bodily injury claims. These 
issues must be considered, to the extent possible, early in the 
third-party claim resolution process.
Arkansas attorneys representing either UST/AST 
owners or operators or third-party plaintiffs seeking property 
damage and/or bodily injury claims must recognize the critical 
role of both the ADPC&E RSTD and Legal Division staff in address-
ing these issues. Both as a legal and a practical matter, they 
play a key role in the resolution of corrective action and third- 
party property damage and/or bodily injury claims. In the case 
of third-party claims, the ADPC&E staff will recommend to the 
trust fund Advisory Committee whether or not they believe the 
proposed settlement between the plaintiff and the UST or AST 
owner or operator is in the best interest of the trust fund. 
Consequently, all parties should ensure that the ADPC&E staff is 
consulted at the earliest point at which it appears a settlement 
is beginning to materialize. Note that a settlement agreement 
should, of course, have a clause making it conditional that the 
third-party property damage and/or bodily injury claim is ap-
proved by the trust fund Advisory Committee.
It is also important to recognize that in the case 
of third-party property damage and/or bodily injury claims, the 
Attorney General's staff plays a role. The Arkansas legislature 
in 1993 amended the trust fund statute to state that any UST or 
AST owner or operator receiving a claim must give written notice 
of it to the ADPC&E not later than 60 days after service of 
summons. Ark Code Ann. § 8-7-908(d)(1). The ADPC&E is then 
required to notify the Attorney General who has the right to 
intervene in the lawsuit. Payment of the third-party claim can 
be denied if the UST or AST owner or operator fails to give 
ADPC&E the required notice. The Arkansas Attorney General's 
staff appears to now be intervening, as a matter of course, in 
the relevant lawsuits. Consequently, they will also play a role 
in resolving these claims through litigation or settlement.
The drafting of a settlement agreement involving 
the resolution of third-party property damage and/or bodily 
injury claims should consider a variety of issues. A recent 
Arkansas example is illustrative. A settlement agreement includ-
ed a typical merger clause indicating that cash remitted to a 
plaintiff settled all claims. However, in the same settlement 
agreement, the UST owner committed to demolish two houses and 
pave two parking lots. The ADPC&E staff took the position that 
the funds for demolishing one of the houses and paving one of the 
parking lots actually constituted "corrective action" costs as 
opposed to a third-party property damage claim. The staff 
indicated that these activities resembled corrective action costs 
despite the merger clause. Therefore, the terms of the settle-
ment agreement should be carefully considered in light of trust
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fund issues. Ambiguous settlement issues should be discussed 
with the staff, and ambiguous language resolved.
4. r c r a Statutory Causes Of Action:
RCRA (42 U.S.C. § 6972) may provide a site owner 
or operator or an adjoining landowner with the opportunity to 
recover from a third party for property damage resulting from 
USTs. This statute allows a private party to bring a citizen 
suit to compel remediation of the contaminated site. Such a 
cause of action may be needed if a current UST owner or operator 
is requesting reimbursement from a former owner or operator for 
the cost of addressing a leak or spill. Thus, if the current 
owner or operator can establish that another party is responsible 
for the contamination in question, the costs of cleaning up the 
site might be borne by that other party.
A recent Ninth Circuit case has potentially 
broadened the use of the RCRA citizen suit provision. In KFC 
Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, the plaintiff, a Kentucky Fried Chicken 
franchisee, had purchased a service station property from the 
defendants in 1975 to establish a restaurant. In 1988, during 
the course of improving the property, KFC found the soil was 
contaminated with constituents of refined petroleum products 
(lead and benzene). Los Angeles governmental agencies forced KFC 
to stop construction and clean up the site. KFC spent $211,000 
to remove the contaminated soil, and then sued the prior owners 
under RCRA to recover these costs.
The federal district court dismissed the suit, 
ruling that RCRA provided only a "public" restitutionary remedy 
that only the government could use. On KFC's appeal, the Ninth 
Circuit reversed, stating: "It would be unfair and poor public
policy to interpret Section 6972(a)(1)(B) [of RCRA] as barring 
[private] restitution actions." The Court made clear that 
private plaintiffs are entitled to recover cleanup costs incurred 
by the plaintiff for past contamination caused by a prior owner. 
In so holding, the Court dismissed the contention of the prior 
owners that there was no "imminent and substantial endangerment" 
to the environment, as required by RCRA, at the time the suit was 
filed.
This case is important because it provides present 
owners of property contaminated with petroleum a potential 
federal cause of action to recover cleanup costs. In contrast to 
the common law causes of action, which can present evidentiary 
and procedural problems, liability under RCRA is relatively 
simple to establish. Basically, the plaintiff need merely 
establish that the prior owner owned the property when releases 
occurred. Moreover, under RCRA, the plaintiff is entitled to 
recover all attorney fees incurred in bringing the action.
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The other edge of this sword should not be ig-
nored. Someone selling a property with a UST where petroleum 
contamination is discovered years later might be held liable for 
substantial cleanup costs. The adoption by the states of "risk- 
based" cleanup standards will reduce, but not eliminate, this 
potential liability. The KFC Western case reinforces the wisdom 
of obtaining complete environmental releases from the buyer when 
selling properties with USTs.
The decision by the Ninth Circuit in is control-
ling law in California, Nevada, Arizona, Washington, Oregon, 
Idaho, Montana, Alaska and Hawaii. The decision also is likely 
to be highly influential in courts throughout the United States 
when addressing the right of private parties to sue for cleanup 
costs under RCRA.
G. ADPC&E REGULATION NO. 1;
H. ASBESTOS:
1. Federal OSHA:
Revised standards for occupational exposure to 
asbestos in the general, construction, and shipyard industries.
59 Fed. Reg. 40964. New worker protection, notice, etc. 
standards.
2. Arkansas Asbestos Abatement Regulations:
I. ARKANSAS SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT:
Note comprehensive revisions to ADPC&E Regulation No.
22 addressing both commercial and non-commercial landfill 
standards.
II. SPECIFIC COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONSHIPS:
A. PURCHASE AND SALE OF IMPROVED AND UNIMPROVED REAL
PROPERTY:
Real estate purchases may present unexpected 
environmental liabilities if there are sources of contamination 
on the property. Under CERCLA (and state counterparts) and the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (along with other federal 
environmental statutes) purchasers, even without knowledge of the 
property's contamination, can be ordered to pay for the cleanup. 
The reasons for such expansive liability are the previously 
discussed responsible party terms such as "owner" and "operator" 
found in the federal (and sometimes state) statutes such as 
CERCLA. Contamination on the property is not the only concern.
A purchaser taking title to a facility will be responsible for
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expending funds to address violations or upgrade equipment that 
is required by the federal and state environmental regulatory 
programs. For example, a buyer purchasing a facility with the 
Clean Water Act National Pollution Discharge Elimination System 
("NPDES") permit will be required to take whatever action is 
necessary to ensure that the effluent discharge is within permit 
limitations. Similarly, the purchaser of a grocery convenience 
store utilizing underground storage tanks will be required to 
upgrade these systems by the applicable deadlines. Whether or 
not the seller is required to inform the buyer of the responsi-
bility he or she may be accepting is the subject of a recent 
Arkansas Supreme Court decision. A recent Arkansas Supreme Court 
decision indicated that the seller may not have a responsibility 
to provide buyer with notice of the federal and state underground 
storage tank upgrade requirements. See generally Wright, In 
Storage Tank Funds We Trust: An Analysis of Their Role in Pro-
tecting the Environment and Small Business. 13 U. Ark. Little 
Rock L.J. 417 (1991).
B.  LEASING:
Lessors and Lessees often negotiate and draft leases 
without carefully considering how environmental risks and 
liabilities are to be allocated between the parties. Lessors or 
lessees who fail to account for environmental risks in lease 
agreements could face unplanned expenditures for remediating 
contamination and/or complying with federal or state environmen-
tal regulatory requirements. The federal and state statutes and 
regulations can potentially impose obligations on both lessors 
and lessees of improved and unimproved real properties. These 
federal and state statutory and regulatory programs can effect 
leasing activities in three ways:
(1) exposure of lessors and lessee to environmental liabil-
ity (For example, see the previous CERCLA discussion 
noting that lessors or lessees can be held responsible 
for contamination even though activity is limited to 
passive property ownership);
(2) prevent lessor or lessee from performing under the 
lease; and
(3) impair lessees's utilization of the property.
The regulatory programs related to underground storage 
tanks offers an example of the need to consider environmental respon
sibilities prior to entering into a lease. Petroleum refiners and 
wholesalers often lease facilities with underground storage tanks to 
independent retailers. The RCRA Subtitle I provisions (identical 
provisions are found in the Arkansas Underground Storage Tank stat-
utes) liability provisions place responsibility for violations on 
both the owner (even if passive) or operator. Therefore, the lessor
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refiner or wholesaler may be held responsible for underground storage 
tank regulatory violations even if the lease provides that lessee 
must maintain compliance with these programs. A discussion of this 
issue in the underground storage tank context can be found at Wright, 
In Storage Tank Funds We Trust: An Analysis of Their Role in Protect-
ing the Environment and Small Business. 13 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 
417, 425 (1991).
In order to minimize potential environmental liabilities, 
the lessor or lessee must identify, evaluate and manage environmental 
risks prior to entering into a lease and during the lease period. A 
discussion of the use of environmental assessments and the allocation 
of environmental responsibilities is found in sections IV and V of 
this outline. However, both the lessor and lessee's perspective on 
these issues can be summarized at this point.
The lessor's principle interest will be to maintain the 
value of the property and avoid environmental liability. Therefore, 
lessor should require that the lessee comply with all relevant 
federal and state statutes and regulations. The lessee should also 
be required to explain in detail his or her proposed use of the 
property. The lease should require that the lessee inform (and 
receive permission) for the proposed use of the property. The lessor 
will, of course, need a lease provision that provides him or her the 
opportunity to assess the lessee's use of the premises. Finally, the 
lessee should be required to inform or copy lessor on any notices or 
correspondence that he provides to federal or state environmental 
agencies (i. e., spill reports, etc.).
In contrast, the lessee must ensure that he or she does not 
take possession of property which will subject it to some type of 
environmental liability. Therefore, in many instances, the lessee 
may find it important to perform an investigation so as to establish 
an environmental baseline for the property at the start of the lease. 
The lessee should receive assurances from the lessor in the form of 
covenants and warranties of the property's condition. Further, the 
lessee should not allow an overly cautious lessor to unnecessarily 
restrict his or her use of the property with overreaching 
environmental covenants.
C. OIL/GAS PROVISIONS:
1. Lease:
Implied duty of restoration by lessee? Bond v.
Sanchez, 289 Ark. 582, 715 S.W. 2d 444 (1986).
2. Mineral and Royalty Conveyances:
Key potential for multiple "owner,” or operators under 
CERCLA and related laws.
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Review
— authority to or actual control
— ownership rights (holding some of the "sticks” in 
the bundle of rights. (Right of control? )
Note Quaker v. United States. 681 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. 
1988). Surface owner held to be "owner" under Section 311 of the 
federal Clean Water Act and therefore he was responsible for cleanup 
of oil containment pit. The pit was used by a previous lessee. Pit 
or pond used by mineral owner?
3. Note oil/gas lessee may want to limit its "ownership" 
and "operating" control over pre-existing contaminated surface 
locations. Define area precisely of surface and subsurface rights. 
Exclude certain area.
III. ENVIRONMENTAL SITE ASSESSMENTS/CONTRACTUAL 
ALLOCATION OF LIABILITIES:
A. Environmental Assessment:
(1) Overview:
An EA provides information to parties relating to 
contamination and/or environmental regulatory compliance of improved 
and unimproved properties. The objective of the EA is to not only 
identify potential environmental contamination or regulatory compli-
ance issues, but to avoid the need for guarding against or negotiat-
ing around the unknown. Data gathered and interpreted in the EA will 
provide the parties vital information for decision making and adop-
tion of negotiation postures.
Information provided by the EA may also be needed for 
the effective use of some of the other environmental issue resolution 
tools discussed in this article. For example, a seller requested to 
warrant the absence of certain contaminants and substances should be 
reluctant to provide such a provision for a given area unless there 
is some level of confidence that none are present. Unless the seller 
has comprehensive knowledge regarding the previous uses of this 
portion of the property, an EA by the seller or both parties may be 
prudent prior to agreeing to such a warranty.
Likewise, a buyer considering the purchase of a 
facility with USTs such as a gasoline convenience store or truck 
terminal may want to assess the regulatory compliance status of this 
equipment. USTs in substantial compliance with the relevant environ-
mental regulations may be eligible for reimbursement for the remedia-
tion of post-acquisition petroleum leakage or spillage pursuant to 
the Arkansas Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund.
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A buyer or lessee may use an EA to attempt to identify 
and quantify environmental risks related to the property or facility. 
Both recognize that the federal and state environmental statutes may 
impose remediation obligations on them for contaminants discovered 
after closing. Besides the simple identification of substances or 
contaminants that may or may not require remediation, the optimal 
result for an initial or subsequent EA is the quantification of the 
cost to perform such remediation.
Both the seller and the purchaser sometimes have an 
incentive to establish a rough baseline through an EA. A baseline is 
an attempt to document the environmental conditions in existence at 
the time of closing against which future changes can be judged. A 
seller of a facility or property might use an appropriate baseline to 
defend against an allegation that hazardous substances discovered 
after closing were generated by the former owner rendering him or her 
a CERCLA responsible party.2
Also consider a lessee preparing to execute a lease 
for a gasoline grocery convenience store or a bulk motor fuel plant. 
If the facility will be utilized for a similar use, the lessee might 
be taking a serious risk if a baseline is not set prior to acquisi-
tion of the leasehold. Otherwise, the lessee may not have the 
information to counter lessor's argument that contamination existing 
at the end of the leasehold term was caused by lessee's use. Obvi-
ously, the lessor may also wish to set a baseline prior to the 
beginning of the lease term so that the lessee cannot claim that 
subsequently discovered motor fuel spillage or leakage was pre-
existing. As a practical matter, as discussed below, Arkansas 
facilities with certain petroleum USTs and above ground storage tanks 
("ASTs") may be eligible for some cleanup cost reimbursement from the 
Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund if certain statutory prerequisites 
are met.
Equally important, the EA should be structured to 
provide the buyer and lessee the projected future cost of compliance 
with any applicable environmental regulatory programs. As an exam-
ple, consider a lessee contemplating entering into a long-term lease 
agreement for several gasoline/grocery convenience stores with USTs 
in which he or she will be contractually allocated environmental 
regulatory compliance responsibilities. The prudent lessee will 
quantify the costs to meet the RCRA Subtitle I UST leak detec- 
tion/upgrade requirements over the next several years.3 Similarly, a 
prospective purchaser or lessee of a building might consider what the 
Clean Air Act chlorofluorocarbon phase-out will cost if the air 
conditioning system must be modified.4
Regulatory compliance concerns are not limited to 
improved properties. For example, a prospective purchaser of unim-
proved property in certain suspect areas may wish to determine if it 
is subject to the FWPCA Wetland 404 permitting requirements by
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obtaining a delineation from the United States Corps of Engineers or 
making such determination itself.
(2) Scope:
The scope of the EA will vary with the type of proper-
ty or facility. It is imperative however, that attorneys remind 
their clients that the relationship between the value of a facility 
and the cost of an EA are not symmetrical. A $75,000 dry cleaning 
facility with ground water contamination is a much more serious 
threat than a properly operated $10 million manufacturing facility. 
Nonetheless, commercial realities will in many instances dissuade the 
client from significant assessment efforts on low value properties. 
Governmental programs such as the Arkansas Petroleum Storage Tank 
Trust Fund may help ameliorate some of the concerns related to 
properties with USTs and ASTs and save EA costs in certain instances.
The actual activities that should be performed during 
the EA is a combination of the parties' perspective and the potential 
activities that have or may have taken place on the property or 
facility. From a potential purchaser or lessee's perspective, for 
example, there are standard information items such as current and 
past property use and governmental record reviews. While the exis-
tence of USTs or asbestos might be a legitimate question at a large 
number of commercial facilities, FWPCA or Clean Air Act compliance 
status issues will be less frequent. Still, even an unimproved piece 
of property may have regulatory issues. As an example, a potential 
purchaser considering manufacturing operations adjacent to a water 
body will need to investigate the cost necessary to obtain a FWPCA 
NPDES permit in this particular area.
Knowledge of the facility's activities or an initial 
inspection may indicate that sampling is necessary to determine 
whether environmental media have been impacted. Sampling for every 
conceivable chemical constituent at the property or facility is not 
practical. While a thorough discussion of sampling is beyond the 
scope of this article, it is important to note the attorney should, 
to the extent possible, ensure that the environmental consultant has 
tailored a sampling plan relevant to past or current activities at 
the facility. If, for example, the property has a history of degrea-
sing activities, the sampling would include common degreasing con-
stituents. In summary, a combination of intuition, judgment, and 
experience should be used to tailor the EA's scope of work to meet 
the client's needs in a commercial transaction.
EAs are performed by consulting firms with various 
types of technical expertise. Attorneys or clients considering the 
retention of an environmental consultant to perform an EA should 
consider a number of issues. The environmental consultant's qualifi-
cations are obviously critical. Different facilities or properties 
may require various types of technical expertise. A purchaser 
considering the acquisition of several older dry cleaning facilities
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may need the services of a hydrogeologist if sampling for groundwater 
and/or soil contamination appears warranted. In contrast, a lessor 
attempting to determine the amount and type of asbestos in his or her 
building would need someone familiar with the substance and the 
different sampling methods.
A written contract between the client and consultant 
to detail the scope of work is always advisable. The scope of work 
is extremely important since the perception of attorneys, clients, 
and consultants as to what constitutes an adequate EA at a given 
property can vary. Misunderstandings can be disastrous.
Consider, for example, a purchaser considering the 
acquisition of a closed restaurant that retains an environmental 
consultant to perform a "Phase I" EA. The environmental consulting 
firm only conducts limited asbestos sampling in accessible areas 
pursuant to its understanding of what constitutes a "Phase I” EA. In 
contrast, the seller assumes that more extensive asbestos sampling 
will be performed because the building is scheduled to be demolished 
after closing.
The limited asbestos sampling is performed and the 
results are negative. The building is demolished. The Arkansas 
Asbestos Abatement Regulations are violated because there was appar-
ently undiscovered friable asbestos behind a large stove. The seller 
and consultant disagree as to whether a "Phase I" should include the 
type of asbestos sampling that would have detected the material in 
this location. This issue would have been addressed if a detailed 
scope of work had been negotiated.
It must also be remembered that the EA process will 
generate information concerning the status of a given business' 
compliance with environmental laws and regulations. Efforts should 
be made to ensure the environmental consultant is contractually 
prevented from disclosing sensitive information. An exception to 
this restriction might reasonably include governmental requests for 
disclosure pursuant to the relevant federal and state environmental 
statutes. Consideration should also be given to whether possible 
protection of information through the attorney/client or work product 
doctrines is possible or desirable.
Finally, environmental consultants sometimes inadver-
tently use inappropriate and unnecessary verbiage in the EA report. 
Consequently, the EA report should be subject to review by the 
attorney and client prior to circulation.
(3) Strategy:
The motivation for a potential purchaser or a lessee 
to perform an EA prior to the acquisition of a facility is fairly 
clear. Neither the purchaser nor the lessee want to acquire a
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property or facility without some understanding of current contamina-
tion or the future regulatory compliance costs.
An aggressive potential purchaser or lessee might also 
use an EA that simply identifies certain potential unquantified 
environmental problems to his or her advantage in negotiations with 
the seller or lessor. The negotiations for a warehouse/fleet fueling 
facility offers a possible example.
Suppose an initial EA cited the existence of older 
petroleum USTs and the failure to obtain a minor air permit for a 
paint booth emitting volatile organic contaminants. The buyer or 
lessee might propose consummating the transaction without additional 
assessment work if a substantial discount in price is provided. The 
buyer's rationale for taking this risk would be the belief that the 
USTs are covered by the Arkansas Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund 
and that the failure to obtain an air permit could be resolved 
without substantial penalties. A nervous or motivated seller might 
provide a discount to a buyer willing to take risks.
Sellers sometime perform EAs prior to marketing the 
property or facility in order to prevent a sophisticated buyer from 
utilizing environmental issues as leverage to discount the price. 
Advance knowledge and resolution of certain environmental issues may 
improve the seller's negotiating position. Certainly, identification 
and resolution of the minor air permit matter referenced in the 
previous example would have eliminated its use by the buyer as an 
argument for a price discount. Similarly, a confirmation that the 
USTs cited in the previous example were in compliance with the 
relevant regulations and consequently eligible for the Arkansas 
Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund would provide some comfort about 
UST spillage or leakage. Conceivably, the seller could also under-
take testing and/or sampling to check for current or historical 
spillage or leakage. If these efforts confirm the absence of prob-
lems or result in a resolution, the seller would have a strong 
argument that a price discount is not warranted.
A seller undertaking an EA prior to marketing the 
property is foregoing the possibility of a potential purchaser 
sharing the cost of this work. More importantly, the seller should 
recognize that there are risks in undertaking an EA. The most 
serious is the possibility that the seller will discover environmen-
tal regulatory violations or contamination that must be reported to 
the federal or state environmental agencies.
The seller may also have to address these issues. If 
the seller continues these non-compliant activities after learning of 
them, the violations become knowing and penalties can escalate 
significantly. The same is true for failing to notify the relevant 
governmental authorities about reportable releases or contamination. 
Therefore, if the seller is considering the performance of an EA, he
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or she must be prepared to address the violations or conditions 
discovered.
(4) Advantages to the Buyer (Summary):
The principal advantages to the buyer/investor from 
the environmental site assessment is determining any risks and 
liabilities associated with the site. Specifically, the environmen-
tal site assessment can quantify the:
(a) probability of a site problem;
(b) extent of the problem;
(c) potential financial liability; and
(d) cost of the cleanup.
With this information, the buyer can determine and negotiate the 
condition of the acquisition.
(5) Advantages to the Seller (Summary):
(a) The seller also benefits from an environmental 
site assessment of the property before a sales transaction is struc-
tured or before a buyer has been identified. Environmental problems 
discovered after the transaction has been structured at the insis-
tence of the buyer puts the seller at a distinct disadvantage.
(b) Advance knowledge of site problems improves the 
seller's negotiating position. The seller may wish to redefine the 
property boundaries to leave out problem areas, or negotiate with the 
buyer for some type of cost sharing arrangement for the cleanup.
(c) If the seller conducts an environmental site 
assessment and finds a problem, it can be resolved and a resolution 
documented before a buyer is identified. Documentation that the site 
is clean is required by many informed buyers and can accelerate the 
sale.
(d) Of particular importance to the seller is reduc-
ing long-term liability and providing protection against future 
claims. By documenting site conditions at the time of sale, the 
seller protects against a buyer coming back at some future time 
requesting cleanup or a newly discovered problem on the site.
(6) The New ASTM Environmental Auditing Standard:
As previously described, Superfund provides a very 
limited defense for purchasers that acquire property with hazardous 
substances that neither knew nor had no reason to know of their 
existence. The American Society of Testing and Materials (”ASTM")
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has attempted to define the necessary audit or review procedures to 
meet the CERCLA innocent landowner defense. It was also an attempt 
to put in writing good commercial and customary practices along with 
the facilitation of high quality environmental assessments.
ASTM has actually promulgated two specific procedures. 
One standard addresses phase one environmental assessments and the 
other, transaction screen process, is designed to be performed by the 
non-environmental professional. The ASTM standards outline the 
working principles of both the ESA and the transaction screen stan-
dard practices.
The transaction screen is primarily a questionnaire 
that consists of up to 23 questions. It is designed to be adminis-
tered by either a purchaser of the property or the lender for the 
purchase at little or no cost other than personal time. Three 
parties complete the questionnaire:
* the owner of the property;
* the operator of the property; and
* the user of the transaction screen 
(the purchaser or the lender).
Each is required to answer certain questions with yes, no, or un-
known. These questions include whether there are any underground 
storage tanks, burial of substances, etc.
Unlike the transaction screen standard, the ASTM 
standard for a phase one is required to be conducted by an environ-
mental professional (i.e., someone who possesses sufficient training 
and experience necessary to conduct a site reconnaissance, inter-
views, and has the ability to develop conclusions regarding recog-
nized environmental conditions). The ASTM phase one requires more 
information and is more costly.
B. Allocation of Risks:
Contracts, including those for the purchase and sale of 
commercial/industrial properties, should generally allocate risks 
between the parties. Environmental risks should be addressed in such 
allocation. (Note: These principles should also generally apply to 
leasing arrangements and lending).
1. Desired environmental risk allocations may sometimes 
be provided inadvertently by general provisions in existing con-
tracts.
2. The direction and degree of environmental risk alloca-
tions in contracts may be dictated by the bargaining power of the 
parties (e.g., major oil company selling retail gasoline outlet to 
independent gasoline marketer).
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3.  The desirability of environmental risk allocations may 
be affected by cost implications (e.g., seller will indemnify buyer 
for all known and unknown environmental problems only if purchase 
price is increased by 25%).
C. Defining Risks:
Defining environmental risks and negotiating their alloca-
tion should be considered carefully in light of:
1. Evolving scope of environmental liability (e.g., 
development of federal and state laws which are continually focusing 
on new environmental problems).
2. Evolving regulatory requirements (e.g., development of 
federal and state regulatory programs that are continually altering 
what type of activities require a permit).
3. Identification of "new" risks:
(a) advances in detection technology (e.g., further 
advances in determining when natural resources such as ground water 
are contaminated);
(b) advances in determining and verifying 
cause/effect and health relationships (will friable asbestos in the 
commercial building setting be determined to cause health problems);
(c) changes in common law standards of care and 
liability (i.e., evolving strict liability standards). Courts may 
decline to interfere where interested and arguably, responsible 
parties have allocated liability by contract (see, e.g., Emhart 
Industries v. Duracell International. Inc., 665 F. Supp. 549 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1987); Mardan v. C.G.C. Music. Ltd., 804 F. 2d 1454 (9th Cir. 
1986). However, note Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex 
Corp., 28 ERC 1083 (3rd Cir. 1988).
D. Objectives of the Parties:
1. Potential environmental concerns in a certain business 
transaction must be identified. Having identified these concerns, 
the objectives of the parties must be identified. Note that one 
party may have several roles. A purchaser, for example, may also be 
a borrower and a lessor.
2. Purchasers:
(a) A purchaser will want to buy a business, facility 
or property that it can cost effectively use as it has planned (e.g., 
what if the Corps of Engineers will not grant a 404 permit for the 
development of the land for purchase? Or it will grant the permit 
buy only if a number of acres is donated?).
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(b) A purchaser will not want to accept liability for 
property contaminated by the seller without a price discount or 
contractual indemnification by the seller.
3.  Sellers:
(a) A seller may wish to be able to address each 
potential concern of the potential buyer. Therefore, the seller may 
wish to engage in an environmental investigation prior to the 
property's sale.
(b) A seller might be liable for fraud or misrepre-
sentation if it knows or should have known of an environmental 
problem which materially affects the transaction and does not dis-
close that condition to the buyer. The prudent seller may wish to 
perform an investigation and disclose what it knows.
(c) A seller might wish to address problems while it 
controls the site. Once control is lost, the seller may be ultimate-
ly liable but have no control over the scope or timing of the clean-
up.
E.  Protecting the Buyer:
1. The Buyer's Considerations:
Assuming that there is some contamination on the 
property to be purchased, the threshold question that must be ad-
dressed is whether the buyer should assume all responsibility for 
remediation of existing contamination or whether he should attempt to 
insulate himself from that responsibility.
(a) Require the Seller to Remediate 
the Contamination:
(i) Buyer by becoming owner of the property has 
become a party responsible for the cleanup of existing contamination 
under Section 107(a) of CERCLA or other various other federal and 
state environmental statutes.
(ii) Seller's remediation activities may interfere 
with the buyer's operations, with buyer in effect losing control over 
areas of his property. For example, major oil company sells three 
convenience stores to independent petroleum marketer. Each location 
has underground storage tank related contamination. The major oil 
company agrees to be responsible for cleanup. Unfortunately, several 
months after the transaction is closed, the independent petroleum 
marketer determines that the remediation methods chosen for each 
location will disrupt traffic flow for several months. It can be 
important to retain some control over remedy choices.
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(b) Buyer Assumes Liability:
(i) This would be done in exchange for a better
purchase price.
(ii) When the extent of the contamination is 
unknown, this is a very risky approach.
(c) Indemnification of Buyer:
(i) This is usually a more desirable approach 
allowing the buyer to remediate the contamination.
(ii) Advantages to the buyer include retaining 
control over the timing and implementation of the remediation activi-
ties and insuring that the activities are undertaken promptly and 
properly.
(iii) The buyer must be sure that the seller will 
have adequate assets to fulfill its indemnification obligation.
2. Environmental Baselines:
(a) The establishment of an environmental baseline is 
one mechanism for allocating responsibilities where the seller is to 
become responsible for the cleanup of prior contamination. In this 
situation a potential problem arises regarding the allocation of 
responsibility for pre-existing contamination versus responsibility 
for post-purchase contamination.
(b) The purpose of the baseline is to quantify the 
level of contamination on a property on the closing date so that the 
purchaser will be responsible for only increases in that level. 
Various sampling programs are available similar to those for the 
environmental site assessment.
(c) It should be recognized, however, that even the 
best environmental baseline can miss things. A soil sample taken in 
one area of the property indicates little, if anything about soil 
contamination 50 feet away. Moreover, contamination will migrate 
into groundwater and contamination levels will change over time.
Thus, the purchaser is at risk as to any contamination that is not 
identified on the baseline because different contaminants or differ-
ent levels of contaminants identified at a later date on this proper-
ty will become the purchaser's responsibility. For these reasons, 
baselines are not a fail-safe approach for a buyer.
3. Leasing:
(a) Where the proposed acquisition is of unimproved 
real property, leasing instead of acquiring should be considered.
Once a person becomes an "owner" under CERCLA, he is liable even
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though he may never have disposed any hazardous substances on the 
property.
(b) Although lessees of property are likely to be 
considered "operators” under Section 107 of CERCLA, and therefore 
subject to liability, their responsibility for the property is more 
likely to be related to their activities during the period of their 
occupancy. Moreover, because there is an owner of the property which 
the federal or state government can pursue, it is more likely that 
the lessee will not be targeted for responsibility for past contami-
nation. The situation will be even more confused when it involves 
underground storage tank problems.
(c) In a state with an environmental transfer stat-
ute, such as New Jersey's ECRA, a lessee may be required to decontam-
inate the property upon termination of the lease.
(d) Indemnity clauses in which a lessee agrees to 
indemnify and hold lessor harmless, even if the problem was caused by 
lessor's actions or fault, have been treated in three ways in the 
various states. Most states permit indemnity clauses in commercial 
leases, but some require clear, unequivocal language for the indemni-
ty clause to apply to lessor's own negligence. A minority of states 
hold that such clauses are void as against public policy.
4. Disclosures, Representations and Warranties;
Representation and warranties will provide useful 
information regarding the other party's knowledge about the condition 
of the property. This information can be important in determining 
the scope of due diligence for a particular transaction. The objec-
tive of representations and warranties is to clearly and accurately 
communicate information. A party should avoid giving conclusions 
about existing conditions or the interpretation of technical informa-
tion. Instead, the party giving the representation should describe 
the information upon which the conclusions are based and the source 
of the information. Where possible, the party to whom the represen-
tations are made should be required to have its own technical advi-
sors to interpret the information.
(a) Representations and warranties regarding the 
environmental conditions may require the seller to disclose:
(i) all the hazardous substances it has generat-
ed, manufactured, or managed, sent off-site, or released or disposed 
of on-site;
(ii) knowledge of prior uses of the site and 
current site conditions;
(iii) possession of all necessary environmental
permits;
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(iv) compliance with applicable permits and
environmental laws;
(v) actual or contingent environmental liabili-
ties;
(vi) threatened or pending litigation, including 
response actions by the government or private parties;
(vii) knowledge of facts and circumstances that 
may give rise to future litigation;
(viii) the existence of environmental liens or
superliens;
(ix) the condition of pollution control equip-
ment;
(x) the presence of PCBs, asbestos and other 
toxic substances integral to equipment and buildings; and
(xi) the existence of wells, underground storage 
tanks, covered-over surface impoundments, and other "hidden" prob-
lems; and,
(xii) investigations by government agencies.
Some of these disclosures may not apply if 
only real estate is being purchased and not the ongoing business.
(b) The seller will usually be responsible for the 
condition of the property at the time of transfer. However, the 
seller should not permit the purchaser's post-transfer activities to 
increase the seller's existing or potential environmental liability. 
Accordingly, the purchaser's representations and warranties should 
include the following matters:
(i) the purchaser is aware of environmental 
conditions that have been disclosed by the seller;
(ii) the purchaser accepts the facility in its 
existing condition, ("as is" warranty);
(iii) the buyer has been given the opportunity to 
conduct an environmental assessment of the facility and either has 
conducted such an assessment or is determined that it is not neces-
sary to conduct an assessment;
(iv) in the event the purchaser does not conduct 
an environmental assessment, he accepts and will be responsible for
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all conditions of the facility, including conditions that would have 
been disclosed by such an assessment;
(v) the buyer will occupy, use, and operate the 
property in compliance with all applicable laws, including applicable 
health, safety and environmental laws;
(vi) the buyer will occupy, use, and operate the 
property in compliance with all applicable permits and approvals;
(vii) the buyer will not treat, store, dispose of, 
incinerate, or recycle any hazardous substances or solid wastes on 
the site except as described in an attached exhibit; and,
(viii) the purchaser will furnish seller copies of 
all environmental assessments, monitoring reports, analyses, and test 
results and related information upon the reguest of the seller.
(c) For various reasons, such as a careless or even 
deliberate misrepresentation by the seller, or financial condition of 
the seller, a prudent buyer should not rely solely on the seller's 
representation but should attempt to verify them through an environ-
mental site assessment tailored to the circumstances.
5.  Indemnification Provisions:
The purpose of an indemnification provision is to 
provide a contractual mechanism to reimburse the indemnified party in 
the event any of the events set forth in the agreement occur.
However, there are several limitations on the usefulness of an 
indemnity. In many instances, environmental liabilities are not 
identified or assessed until many years after the occurrence of the 
events that created the liability. During this period, circumstances 
affecting the parties on the site may have changed substantially.
For example, the indemnitor may have dissolved or become bankrupt.
Second, indemnification agreements can be difficult to 
enforce. In some cases the indemnitor may refuse to pay the claim 
that is the subject of the obligation without a lawsuit.
Third, the indemnitor will usually have no control 
over the property or facility that is covered by the indemnification 
agreement during the period of indemnification. The activities of a 
successor-owner may increase the amount of contamination on the site 
or the cost of the remedy, with the result in increasing the seller's 
percentage share of liability beyond his actual responsibility. 
Additionally, it may be impossible to determine whether the 
indemnitor's indemnification obligation should stop and whether the 
responsibility of the successor-owner should begin.
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Issues Include:
(i) An indemnification for liabilities flowing from 
activities that took place while the seller held title to the proper-
ty should be considered by a buyer.
(ii) The indemnification should cover all expenses, 
including attorneys' fees and related litigation expenses. A duty- 
to-defend provision may also be considered.
(iii) The buyer should be certain that the indemnifi-
cation is given by a corporate entity which will have sufficient 
assets to meet the indemnification obligation.
(iv) Typically, if a buyer requests an indemnification 
provision, he can expect to be asked for an indemnity for any post-
transfer activities. As long as the indemnity is carefully worded, 
this should not create unreasonable liability.
F. Protecting the Seller:
1. The Seller's Considerations:
(a) Liability from Prior Activities:
(i) The seller must ensure that he is not trans-
ferring title to property that may pose a significant risk of adverse 
health or environmental consequences to the buyer, his employees or 
the public at large.
(ii) As selling the property removes the property 
from the seller's control, its use may be changed from one that is 
compatible with its current environmental condition to one that is 
incompatible with its environmental condition. For example, a 
manufacturing site having low-level soil contamination may meed no 
remediation if it continues as a manufacturing site, but would if it 
becomes a grade school or a residential housing development.
(iii) It is therefore prudent to avoid trans-
ferring properties or businesses that pose a significant risk to 
public health or the environment, whatever the future use, unless 
provisions are put into the agreement to protect the seller.
(b) Liability from the Buyer's Activities:
(i) The seller must assure that any contami-
nation from the buyer's activities on the property will not, in the 
future, be linked or attributed to him.
(ii) When a seller undertakes to dispose of 
property or a business which is associated real property, he should 
know the extent of contamination, if any, on the property. If he
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does not know, he should undertake an environmental site assessment, 
similar to that described earlier, to determine if contamination is 
likely to exist.
2.  Disclosure of Environmental Conditions:
As a seller, the first rule is to disclose all knowl-
edge of the environmental condition of the property. Sellers are 
ill-advised to withhold information regarding the environmental 
condition of the property. Even where there has been no affirmative 
representation, some cases have held non-disclosure to be the basis 
for a cause of action premised upon failure to disclose a material 
fact.
3.  Releases:
(a) An attempt should be made to secure a release 
from any environmental liability relating to the existing condition 
of the property:
(i) where a seller has undertaken substantial 
environmental remediation activities on a piece of property, or
(ii) where a seller knows the property to be free 
from environmental contamination.
(b) A buyer will be reluctant to grant a release as 
to the existing condition of the property, especially where the 
property is an old manufacturing facility and it is difficult to know 
the complete condition of the property.
4.  Indemnification for Post-Transfer Activities:
(a) Where the seller believes that the buyer's post-
transfer activities may degrade the environmental condition of the 
property, the seller should consider seeking an indemnification from 
any liability associated with these activities.
(b) If such indemnification is requested, then the 
buyer is likely to request an indemnification for pre-existing 
contamination. In determining the negotiating strategy, it must be 
recognized that the buyer will have a CERCLA cause of action against 
the seller with or without an indemnification provision.
(c) "As is” clauses have had varying amounts of 
success in releasing a seller from liability to the buyer for envi-
ronmental conditions affecting the property. Some courts have held 
that an "as is" clause is not effective unless it expressly mentions 
the relevant environmental condition. Amland Properties Corp. v. 
ALCOA, 711 F. Supp. 784 (D.NJ. 1989). Other courts have held that 
they are warranty disclaimers and only serve to bar actions based on
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breach of warranty. Wiegman & Rose International Corp. v. N.L. 
Industries, 735 F. Supp. 97 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
5. Indemnification to the Buyer:
(a) A seller should look for ways to limit his long-
term liabilities under indemnification provisions. Because the 
seller's activities are not continuing on the property and liability 
is determined by existing conditions, the seller may be able to limit 
the extent of the indemnification.
(b) Limitations on liability under indemnification 
provisions may include:
(i) a time limitation;
(ii) limitations on the extent and types of 
losses (such as excluding consequential damages); and
(iii) a cap on total liability.
IV. AUDITS AND ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE
A. INTERNAL ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITS OR CORPORATE COMPLIANCE
PROGRAMS
(1) Motivation Risks Related to Internal Audits:
The civil and criminal provisions of the federal and 
state environmental statutes are broad, convoluted and complex. 
Compliance with the regulatory provisions therefore demands a high 
degree of technical and legal sophistication. As a result, even a 
sophisticated and conscientious company will occasionally find itself 
out of compliance and at risk of criminal prosecution.
If some noncompliance is inevitable, there are two 
ways in which it may be identified. The first is through the perfor-
mance of a compliance environmental audit; the second is through a 
federal and state agency enforcement action. An environmental 
compliance audit might generally be defined as a "systematic, docu-
mented, periodic and objective review of facility operations and 
practices related to meeting environmental requirements." In the 
alternative, it is a method of verifying that regulations, company 
policy, and good operating practices are being obeyed. Self-policing 
and correction of environmental compliance, although sometimes 
costly, may in some cases be less expensive than compliance pursuant 
to agency enforcement actions. However, there are risks. The audits 
may uncover instances of historical violations, as well as existing 
violations or prospective problems. Such problems could require 
substantial expenditures to correct.
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Once such a discovery is made, the company and its 
management face the risk of criminal sanctions, as well as civil or 
administrative enforcement, if the company chooses to continue to 
operate without correcting or abating the violations. Moreover, the 
audit may produce findings that, in some circumstances, must be 
reported to enforcement agencies under federal or state reporting 
requirements, which may in turn trigger enforcement action.
The failure to correct violations or report releases 
(as required by federal or state statutes) discovered during an 
environmental audit could subject certain employees and management to 
allegations that they "knowingly” failed to comply with federal and 
state environmental requirements. As will be discussed, the courts 
interpreting the federal criminal environmental liability provisions 
could conceivably hold certain management officials liable even if 
the employee that discovered the violation failed to bring it to 
their attention. Information that an environmental audit may produce 
is disseminated to personnel with the authority to act in a timely 
manner.
The threats posed by failing to address instances of 
noncompliance or reporting requirements are three-fold. First, the 
term "person" in federal criminal environmental statutes has been 
defined to include corporations. For example, the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act ("RCRA") defines a person as "an individual, 
trust, firm, joint stock, corporation. . .  or any interstate body. " 
42 U. S. C. § 6903(15). The ability to prosecute a corporation as a 
"person" under the "collective knowledge" doctrine has reduced the 
requisite intent necessary to sustain a conviction under the environ-
mental statutes requiring knowing conduct. This doctrine allows the 
collective knowledge of a corporation's employees, acquired within 
the scope of their employment to be imputed to the corporation. See 
1K. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Liability § 40:05 (1984). Therefore, 
a corporation can be convicted for a knowing violation even though no 
one employee had actual knowledge of all elements of the violation.
Second, although federal environmental statutes 
generally require some degree of intent for criminal liability, the 
government need only demonstrate that a person knew what he or she 
was doing, and that they did it voluntarily, and not accidentally. 
Normally it is not necessary to show that he or she actually knew 
what the law required or that he or she acted with the specific 
purpose of violating the law. See, e.g ., United States v. Haves 
Int'l Corp., 786 F. 2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986). In Hayes, the court 
upheld a plant employee's RCRA conviction, finding that so long as 
there is knowledge that the waste is not innocuous, the knowledge 
requirement is satisfied. Therefore, the government was not required 
to prove knowledge of its classification as hazardous nor knowledge 
that a permit was required for its disposal.
Third, the targets for environmental criminal prosecu-
tions are often individual employees of the corporation, in addition
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to the corporate entity itself. Such targeted individuals include 
not only environmental engineers, but also corporate officers with 
broad responsibilities for development of corporate environmental 
policies and capacity to influence compliance with company policies 
and procedures. In targeting management for criminal prosecution, 
the federal government increasingly relies upon the "responsible 
corporate officer" doctrine to define and prove individual culpabili-
ty. This doctrine allows the government to prove "knowing conduct" 
inferentially, based upon the defendant's relative position in the 
company, coupled with failure to learn certain facts or take appro-
priate action.
This doctrine originated with United States v. Dotter- 
weich, 320 U. S. 277 (1943), a non-environmental case (food and drug) 
in which a corporate president was criminally charged even though 
there was no evidence that he was aware of the unlawful conduct. In 
Dotterweich, the United States Supreme Court held that "[t]he offense 
is committed. . .  by all who do have such a responsible share in the 
furtherance of the transaction which the statue outlaws, " and sug-
gested that corporate officers have a duty to learn the facts if 
ignorant of them. More recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that 
doctrine in another food and drug case, United States v. Park, 421 
U. S. 658 (1975), where it upheld a criminal conviction of a corporate 
officer under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, holding that 
the government need only prove that the manager had the responsibili-
ty and the power to prevent or correct a violation of the statute.
This prosecutorial tool, imputing knowledge of legal 
violations to responsible managers where direct evidence is lacking, 
is now being used to prosecute officers under various environmental 
statutes. See, e. g., United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 
F. 2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v. Frezzo Bros., 602 F. 2d 
1123, 1130 n. ll (3d Cir. 1979) (in upholding criminal convictions of 
corporate officers charged with federal Clean Water Act ("CWA") 
violations, the court noted that the government argued the case on 
the responsible corporate officer doctrine and that it perceived no 
error in the trial court's instruction on this theory).
Appellate courts have applied this doctrine in an 
environmental setting. In Johnson & Towers, the Third Circuit upheld 
the criminal convictions of a plant foreman and service manager, 
finding that the RCRA penalty provisions apply to "responsible 
corporate officers, " who include employees as well as operators, "if 
they knew or should have known that there had been no compliance with 
the permit requirement. . . .  " id. at 664-65. The broad applica-
tion of the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine is supported by 
the criminal provisions of certain federal and state environmental 
laws. CWA, § 309(c)(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6) (1988) (expressly
provides for criminal liability for "any responsible corporate 
officer") Clean Air Act ("CAA") § 113(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(3) 
(1988) (expressly provides that penalty provisions apply to "any 
responsible corporate officer"); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,
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Pub, L. No. 101-549, § 701, 104 Stat. 2399, 2677 (codified at 42 
U .S .A .A. § 7413(c)(6) (West Supp. 1991)) ("the term 'person' includes 
. . .  any responsible corporate officer").
More recently, however, in United States v. MacDonald 
& Watson Oil Co., 933 F. 2d 35, 55 (1st Cir. 1991), another RCRA 
enforcement case, a different appellate court declined to extend the 
reach of the responsible corporate officer doctrine to permit knowl-
edge to be inferred solely from the defendant's corporate position.
In MacDonald & Watson, the First Circuit held that "a mere showing of 
official responsibility" does not by itself constitute sufficient 
proof of culpability with regard to criminal offenses that have an 
express "knowledge" or scienter requirement. Distinguishing Johnson 
& Towers, where the issue involved knowledge of the law, i.e., permit 
requirements, the MacDonald & Watson court held that a company 
officer could be held liable under the doctrine only if the govern-
ment proved knowledge of facts relative to the violation charged. 
However, the court acknowledged that such knowledge could be proven 
inferentially by circumstantial evidence, including "willful blind-
ness" to the facts.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. 912 
F. 2d 741, 748-49 (4th Cir. 1990), has been one of the 
more stringent applications of the responsible corporate officer 
doctrine. The defendants in Dee were civilian engineers employed to 
develop chemical warfare systems for the Army. Gepp, a chemical 
engineer, was responsible for operations and maintenance at the 
facility. Dee and Lentz were Gepp's superiors. As heads of their 
respective departments, the defendants were responsible for ensuring 
that provisions of various company compliance policies, as well as 
the RCRA requirements, were fulfilled within their departments and 
that their subordinates were aware and in compliance with those 
regulations. The district court found all three guilty of multiple 
violations of RCRA for illegally storing, treating, and disposing of 
hazardous waste.
The defendants argued that they did not knowingly 
violate RCRA. The defendants claimed that they did not know that 
violation of RCRA was a crime and that they were unaware that the 
chemicals they managed were hazardous. The court held that ignorance 
of the law is no defense and, more specifically, that the government 
did not need to prove the defendants knew of the violations. It was 
enough that they knew of the generally hazardous nature of the 
chemicals they were handling. Applying the reasoning of the public 
welfare statutes to RCRA, the court stated that "where. . .  danger-
ous or deleterious devices or products of obnoxious waste materials 
are involved, the probability of regulation is so great that anyone 
who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with them 
must be presumed to be aware of the regulation."
Defendant Gepp contended that there was insufficient 
evidence that he directed the storage or disposal operations. He
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asserted that "[s]loppy storage procedures is [sic] not a crime. " The 
court strongly disagreed, stating "[n]egligent and inept storage of 
hazardous waste is one of the evils RCRA was designed to prevent, and 
§ 6928(d) makes such egregious behavior a crime. " The court found 
evidence that Gepp was in charge of operations at the plant, had 
originally ordered placement of the hazardous chemicals in a storage 
shed, had repeatedly ignored warnings about the hazardous condition 
of chemicals that were improperly stored, and had made no effort to 
comply with RCRA regulations. The court found this evidence suffi-
cient for the imposition of criminal liability under RCRA.
Notwithstanding the circumscribed application of the 
responsible corporate officer doctrine in MacDonald & Watson, the 
responsible corporate officer doctrine remains available to pursue 
corporate officers with direct, or even indirect responsibility for 
environmental matters.
(2) Federal Enforcement Positions on Compliance
Environmental Auditing:
A comprehensive environmental compliance audit program 
may reveal instances of noncompliance. The various statutes require 
that certain violations or events be reported. However, many do not 
have to be brought to the agency's attention. Therefore, it is 
appropriate to review the EPA, Department of Justice ("DOJ") and the 
United States Congress' (most recent statement) views on the treat-
ment a company should expect if a violation is discovered, voluntari-
ly reported, and expeditiously remedied.
(a) EPA Environmental Auditing Policy (Summary);
EPA issued a policy statement on environmental 
auditing effective July 19, 1986. 51 Fed. Reg. 25004 (1986). The
interim policy statement was published in the Federal Register on 
November 8, 1985. 50 Fed. Reg. 46504-08 (1985). The policy was
summarized by EPA as follows:
It is EPA policy to encourage the use of environ-
mental auditing by regulated entities to help 
achieve and maintain compliance with environmen-
tal laws and regulations, as well as to help 
identify and correct unregulated environmental 
hazards. This policy statement specifically:
*Encourages regulated entities to develop, imple-
ment, and upgrade environmental auditing pro-
grams;
*Discusses when the Agency may request audit 
reports (it will not routinely do so);
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*Explains how EPA's inspection and enforcement 
activities may respond to regulated entities' 
efforts to assure compliance through auditing;
*Endorses environmental auditing at federal fa-
cilities;
*Encourages state and local environmental audit-
ing initiatives; and
*Outlines elements of effective audit programs.
51 Fed. Reg. 25004 (1906).
The EPA policy statement cautions that "the existence of an auditing 
program does not create any defense to, or otherwise limit, the 
responsibility of any regulated entity to comply with applicable 
regulatory requirements."
(b) DOJ Guidance (Summary):
In an effort to provide a framework for determin-
ing when to pursue criminal sanctions and to provide the regulated 
community with a "sense of how the federal government exercises its 
criminal prosecutorial discretion." DOJ issued in 1991 a guid-
ance entitled Factors in Decisions on Criminal Prosecutions for 
Environmental Violations in the Context of Significant Voluntary 
Compliance or Disclosure Efforts by the Violator ("Guidance"). 
Specifically, the Guidance articulates the factors that the DOJ will 
consider in deciding whether to initiate an environmental criminal 
prosecution and whether circumstances exist that warrant prosecution 
of a lesser charge. It also provides a number of hypothetical exam-
ples demonstrating how the criteria should be applied. The Guidance 
is relevant since it specifically considers the scenario in which a 
regulated facility voluntarily discloses a violation.
The Guidance indicates that it is the DOJ's 
policy "to encourage self-auditing, self-policing and voluntary 
disclosure of environmental violations by the regulated community by 
indicating that these activities are viewed as mitigating factors in 
the DOJ's exercise of criminal environmental enforcement discretion." 
In other words, criminal prosecutions should not create a disincenti-
ve for companies undertaking internal audits and disclosing the 
results. The Guidance articulates six factors the DOJ should 
consider in determining whether or not and how to prosecute companies 
that disclose violations. It expressly provides that no one factor 
will likely be dispositive in any given case and other relevant 
factors, including those not contained in the Guidance, may be 
applicable in a given situation.
The first of three main factors is whether the 
person made "a voluntary, timely, and complete disclosure of the
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matter under investigation.” Specifically, the Guidance appears to 
give weight to persons who promptly come forward after discovering a 
violation and who provide information that aids the government's 
investigation. Disclosure that is mandated by a statute, regulation, 
or permit is not considered voluntary.
The degree and timeliness of the violator's 
cooperation is the second main factor considered by the DOJ. Coopera-
tion, as expressed in the Guidance, pertains to the person's willing-
ness to assist the government in its investigation, including provid-
ing all relevant data and information. Specific examples of the 
types of information the DOJ may seek include the results of internal 
investigations and the names of all potential witnesses.
The third main factor is "the existence and scope 
of any regularized, intensive, and comprehensive environmental 
compliance program; such a program may include an environmental 
compliance or management audit.” The recognizes that various audit 
or compliance programs exist, but emphasizes that the programs must 
include sufficient measures to identify and prevent future violations 
and must have been established in a timely manner.
Specifically, DOJ will look to see: (1) whether
there was a corporate policy emphasizing compliance with all environ-
mental requirements; (2) whether safeguards existed that exceed those 
required by law to prevent violations from occurring; (3) whether 
regular audit procedures, with sufficient safeguards to ensure the 
audit's integrity, were followed; and (4) whether the company provid-
ed sufficient resources for an effective audit program and was 
committed to respond expeditiously and effectively to the conditions 
discovered by the audit.
In addition to the three main factors, the 
Guidance describes three other criteria that may be relevant in a 
particular case. The first criterion focuses on the company's 
history of noncompliance. A company with a history of noncompliance 
"may indicate systemic or repeated participation in or condonation of 
criminal behavior." The second criterion relates to whether the 
company has an effective disciplinary system, which not only punishes 
offenders but also alerts other employees that criminal conduct is 
unacceptable. The third criterion is whether and how quickly the 
company corrected the violation. In fact, the Guidance indicates 
that "considerable weight" will be given to those persons who under-
take prompt, good-faith efforts to reach environmental compliance 
agreements.
To further assist federal prosecutors (and the 
regulated community), the Guidance includes several hypothetical 
examples of how the Justice Department will apply the factors in 
evaluating environmental cases. The examples encompass both ends of 
the spectrum— from situations when criminal prosecution should not 
occur to situations when the government should pursue the maximum
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penalty. The Guidance notes that each case will differ not only in 
which factors are present but also the degree to which the criteria 
are satisfied.
The "ideal hypothetical case" described in the 
Guidance is one involving a company with an effective compliance 
program with established policies and training programs that regular-
ly conduct compliance audits. Upon discovery of a violation, the 
company undertakes an internal investigation to confirm the informa-
tion about a potential violation discovered by the audit and disclos-
es all relevant information concerning the violation to the govern-
ment, including the names of those involved in the criminal activi-
ties.
It then attempts to correct any false information 
previously submitted to the government and disciplines the employees 
involved in the criminal conduct. Finally, the company promptly and 
completely remedies the violation and reviews its compliance program 
to determine how the violation "slipped through the cracks." In this 
situation, the Guidance indicates that the company "would stand a 
good chance of being favorably considered for prosecutorial leniency, 
to the extent of not being criminally prosecuted at all." The 
Guidance provides, however, the degree of leniency will depend on all 
relevant factors, including those not addressed in the Guidance.
The Guidance also provides examples of a situa-
tion when prosecutorial leniency would be remote, when prosecution of 
a lesser charge may occur, or when pursuing employees instead of the 
company may be appropriate. It concludes by providing that "mitigat-
ing efforts made by the regulated community will be recognized and 
evaluated. The greater the showing of good faith, the more likely it 
will be met with leniency. Conversely, the less good faith shown, 
the less likely that prosecutorial discretion will tend toward 
leniency."
(c) Clean Air Act (1990 Amendments):
The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee 
of Conference for the CAA Amendments of 1990 contains hortatory 
language specifically intended to encourage owners and operators of 
sources subject to the Clean Air Act to conduct self-evaluations and 
self-audits. 136 Cong. Rec. 13,101 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). The 
Joint Statement provides in part:
Nothing in subsection 113(c) is intended to dis-
courage owners or operators of sources subject to 
this Act from conducting self-evaluations or 
self-audits and acting to correct any problems 
identified. On the contrary, the environmental 
benefits from such review and prompt corrective 
act ion are substantial and section 113 should be
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read to encourage self-evaluation and self-au-
dits.
Owners and operators of sources are in the best 
position to identify deficiencies and correct 
them, and should be encouraged to adopt proce-
dures where internal compliance audits are per-
formed and management is informed. Such internal 
audits will improve the owners' and operators' 
ability to identify and correct problems before, 
rather than after, government inspections and 
other enforcement actions are needed.
The criminal penalties available under subsection 
113(c) should not be applied in a situation where 
a person, acting in good faith, promptly reports 
the results of an audit and promptly acts to 
correct any deviation. Knowledge gained by an 
individual solely in conducting an audit or while 
attempting to correct any deficiencies identified 
in the audit or the audit report itself should 
not ordinarily form the basis of the intent which 
results in criminal penalties.
(d) December 22, 1995 EPA Policy Statement (60 Fed. 
Reg. 66706). Policy Statement on incentives provided for voluntary 
disclosure of violations. Include reduction of gravity component of 
civil penalties and no recommendation for criminal prosecution. 
Addresses requests for audits.
(e) Arkansas and Other State Environmental Audit 
Privileges:
See appended outline.
(3) Protecting Audit Information:
For various reasons, companies may want to keep some 
or all of the information generated by the environmental compliance 
audit confidential. Besides the federal or state environmental 
requirements, companies could be required to disclose information 
developed during the course of an environmental compliance audit in 
two instances.
First, the EPA or state environmental enforcement 
agency could require submission of information under the various 
environmental statutes that authorize these agencies to discover 
information and to compel record keeping, pollution monitoring and 
reporting, and access for agency inspectors. The information provid-
ed the federal or state agency pursuant to these authorities could 
result in an enforcement action or mandate for remediation. However, 
as a practical matter, agency access to such information may not
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always be a concern, since the environment compliance audit will deal 
with many areas that the federal and state regulations already 
require to be reported to agencies, such as permit excursions.
EPA stated in its audit policy that it would not 
routinely request the results of environmental compliance audits.
See 51 Fed. Reg. 25, 004 (July 9, 1986). However, EPA specifically 
reserved the right to request an audit (or relevant portion of an 
audit) whenever necessary for an enforcement action and particularly 
when pertinent to a criminal investigation.
DOJ has sought to use environmental audit information 
in two recent cases, United States v. Dexter and United States v. 
Weyerhaeuser. Walker Trust in Auditing, But Verify. Envt'l. Forum 
(Jan./Feb. 1992) at 41 ("hereinafter "Walker"). The author of the 
previously cited article, an EPA enforcement attorney, states:
[W]ith the exception of audits initiated as a 
condition of consent agreements or decrees, the 
EPA, in fact, rarely ever seeks to obtain or use 
any information contained in audit reports.
Walker at 41.
The second manner in which an environmental compliance 
audit could become public is through discovery requests and civil 
litigation brought by private entities. Parallel proceedings against 
a corporation and its officers can occur consecutively or simulta-
neously. Proponents in the various actions often request disclosure 
of documents and information.
(a) The Limited Strategies to Protect 
Confidentiality:
(i) Attorney-client privilege:
To obtain the benefit of the attorney-client 
privilege for an environmental audit, a company must perform the 
environmental audit as part of legal advice from an attorney, rather 
than as a routine management analysis. There is no clear test for a 
claim of the privilege; rather, courts evaluate privilege claims on a 
case-by-case basis. The purpose of the attorney-client privilege, 
which attaches to corporations and individuals, is to encourage 
clients to make full and frank disclosure to their attorneys so that 
the attorney may render sound legal advice. The privilege extends to 
communications from as well as to the attorney; therefore, it pro-
tects both the client's furnishing of information and the attorney's 
furnishing of legal advice.
The traditional elements of the privilege 
that must be present for a communication to be held confidential are:
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(1) the communication must be made in order to obtain 
legal advice;
(2) the communication must be with an attorney;
(3) both the client and the attorney must maintain the 
confidentiality of the communication; and
(4) neither the client nor the attorney may have waived 
the privilege.
United States v. United Shoe March. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 
(D. Mass. 950). Because courts strictly construe privilege claims, 
companies must plan and initiate the environmental auditing process 
so that the requisites of the attorney-client privilege exist for all 
communications that are desired to be kept confidential.
In United States v. Chevron. 1989 U.S. Dist. 
Lexis 12267 at 17 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 1989), for example, the court 
rejected a claim of attorney-client privilege and ordered production 
of environmental audit reports, finding that Chevron had failed to 
demonstrate that its in-house counsel had been acting in a legal 
capacity when she participated in the audit or that the communication 
pertained primarily to legal assistance.
(ii) Work-product privilege:
(A) Protected material;
The work-product privilege provides a 
second potential means of protecting information. An attorney's 
legal analysis of whether a facility may have violated an 
environmental statute or regulation is one example of work-product in 
the environmental context.
The privilege belongs to and protects 
the interests of both the client and the attorney, either of whom may 
assert it. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) codifies the 
elements of the privilege, which provides qualified protection for 
documents, notes, and other tangible things prepared for or by an 
attorney "in anticipation of litigation," as well as for "mental 
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attor-
ney." Most courts have held that the work-product privilege also 
protects the work of consultants hired by an attorney on the client's 
behalf, although the work may receive the lesser protection afforded 
documents.
The purpose of this privilege is to 
provide the degree of privacy necessary for the attorney to prepare 
the client's case vigorously. Upjohn Co. v. United States. 449 U.S. 
383, 398-99 (1981) (quoting Hickman v. Tavlor. 329 U.S. 495, 511 
(1947)). For this reason, the work-product privilege protects a
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broader category of material than the attorney-client privilege. 
Despite this broader coverage, the work-product privilege is probably 
less useful in protecting environmental compliance audits and sup-
porting documents than the attorney-client privilege. Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 26 permits the disclosure of documents and tangi-
ble items that constitute an attorney's work-product upon a showing 
of substantial need and the inability to obtain the equivalent 
without undue hardship. Moreover, the privilege only applies when 
litigation may reasonably be foreseen, a condition which might not be 
present in some instances.
The privilege offers greater protection 
for work-product that reflects the attorney's mental processes. So- 
called "opinion" work-product includes memoranda or notes based on 
recollection and evaluation of oral interviews. To the extent that an 
environmental audit revealed an attorney' s mental processes, such as 
evaluations of employee oral statements or questionnaire responses, 
then it would constitute opinion work-product.
To maximize the opportunities for 
protection of the environmental audit and documents under opinion 
work-product, an attorney may actually have to prepare the materials. 
Thus, if a company wishes to establish work-product protection for 
the environmental audit, the company should structure the review so 
that an attorney gathers as much of the information as possible 
through employee interviews, and records the information in handwrit-
ten notes and memoranda. Whether or not a company deems such effort 
worthwhile, is of course a business decision that will be driven by 
the perceived risks of the environmental audit of a particular 
facility.
(iii) Self-evaluative privilege:
The third basis for a claim of confiden-
tiality is the limited protection that may be afforded the self- 
evaluative portion of environmental audits. This judicially created 
privilege might protect a company's candid self-evaluation of compli-
ance with state or federal laws. The privilege protects only self- 
evaluative elements of reports, not the factual material itself. In 
addition, a showing of exceptional necessity can overcome the privi-
lege. Courts generally decide a claim used on this privilege by 
balancing the public policies favoring and opposing disclosure.
The self-evaluative privilege is still 
evolving from its first recognition in Bertice v. Doctor's Hospital. 
Inc., 50 F. R. D. 249 (D. D. C. 1970), aff'd mem., 479 F. 2d 920 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), and remains largely undefined. The courts generally 
require that three elements be present:
(1) the information to be shielded from discovery results 
from a critical self-analysis by the party seeking 
protection;
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(2) the public has a strong interest in preserving the 
free flow of the type of information sought; and
(3) the information must be of the type whose flow would 
be curtailed if discovery were allowed.
One might argue that the self-evaluative 
privilege is strengthened by the EPA's recognition in its Auditing 
Policy, that regulated entities need to self-evaluate environmental 
performance with some measure of privacy. See, e. g., J. Crist, 
Reporting, Recordkeeping and Disclosure Requirements for An Environ-
mental Audit. 5 (1989). However, EPA has not guaranteed it will not 
request environmental audit information.
This issue has been addressed in the envi-
ronmental audit context in at least one unreported decision. In 
United States v. Dexter Corp., a court ruled that the government was 
entitled to obtain certain documents even though they were claimed to 
be shielded by the self-evaluation privilege. Walker at 41. The 
court found that the privilege would violate public policy against 
discharges of wastes and frustrate the government's enforcement of 
the Clean Water Act.
Endnotes:
1. Ark. Code Ann. § 8-7-901 seq.
2. CERCLA responsible parties are listed in Section 107(a).
42 U. S. C. § 9607(a).
3. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 280 et seq.
4. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7671 et seq .
- 68-
